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Abstract
Let T be any of the three canonical truth theories CT− (Compositional truth with-
out extra induction), FS− (Friedman–Sheard truth without extra induction), andKF−
(Kripke–Feferman truth without extra induction), where the base theory of T is PA
(Peano arithmetic). We show that T is feasibly reducible toPA, i.e., there is a polynomial
time computable function f such that for any proof π of an arithmetical sentence φ in
T , f(π) is a proof of φ in PA. In particular, T has at most polynomial speed-up over
PA, in sharp contrast to the situation for T [B] for finitely axiomatizable base theories B.
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1 Introduction
One of the celebrated results in the area of axiomatic theories of truth is the Krajewski-
Kotlarski-Lachlan (KKL) theorem [13] that asserts that every countable recursively satu-
ratedmodel ofPA (Peano arithmetic) is expandable to amodel ofCT−[PA] (compositional
truth over PA with no extra induction1). The KKL theorem is an overtly model-theoretic
result, but it is well-known that it is equivalent to the conservativity of CT−[PA] over PA.2
Recent proofs of the KKL theorem given by Enayat and Visser [5] (using model-theoretic
techniques) and Leigh [15] (using proof-theoretic machinery) show that CT−[B] is con-
servative over B for every "base theory" B (i.e., a theory B that supports a modicum of
coding machinery for handling elementary syntax). Leigh’s proof makes it clear that if
B is a base theory with a computable set of axioms, then CT−[B] is proof-theoretically re-
ducible to B, and in particular, there is a primitive recursive function f such that for any
proof π of a sentence φ in CT−[B], where φ is a sentence in the language of B, f(π) is a
proof of φ in B. Indeed, Leigh’s "reducing function" f is readily seen to be a provably total
function of the fragment of PRA (Primitive Recursive Arithmetic) commonly known as
I∆0 + Supexp.
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The main result of this paper shows that CT−[PA] is feasibly reducible to PA, i.e., there
is a polynomial-time computable function f such that for any proof π of an arithmetical
sentence φ in CT−[PA], f(π) is a proof of φ in PA. The feasible reducibility of CT−[PA] to
PA readily implies that CT−[PA] does not exhibit significant speed-up over PA, i.e., there
is a polynomial function p(x) such that for any arithmetical sentence φ, if φ is provable in
CT−[PA] by a proof of length n (in some standard proof system4), then φ is provable in
PA by a proof of length p(n). This solves a problem posed by Enayat in 2012 [4].
The absence of significant speed up of CT−[PA] over PA implied by the feasible re-
ducibility of CT−[PA] to PA exhibits a dramatic difference between CT−[PA] and CT−[B]
for finitely axiomatized base theories B, since as shown by Fischer [7], CT−[B] has su-
perexponential speed-up over B for finitely axiomatized base theories B, and therefore,
CT−[B] is not feasibly reducible to B for finitely axiomatized base theories B. It is also
known that CT−[PA] + Int (where Int is the axiom of internal induction) is conservative
1This theory is referred to as CT↾ in [10], CT− in [2], and PAFT in [5].
2This equivalence follows from two key facts: (1) every countable consistent theory has a countable re-
cursively saturated model, and (2) countable recursively saturated models are resplendent, both of which
can be verified in the subsystem ACA0 of second order arithmetic.
3Supexp asserts the totality of the superexponential function Supexp(n, x), with Supexp(0, x) = x and
Supexp(n+ 1, x) = 2Supexp(n,x). Leigh [15] refers to this function as hyper-exponentiaton.
4The choice of the "standard proof system" is immaterial since it is well-known that any two such systems
polynomially simulate each other [18].
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overPA ([13], [15]) but not feasibly reducible to PA since it has superexponential speed-up
over PA [7].
Our proof of the feasible reduction of CT−[PA] to PA includes the verification that
PA proves the formal consistency of every finite subtheory of CT−[PA], thereby estab-
lishing that CT−[PA] is a reflexive theory. This result follows from Leigh’s work [15]; and
was also established by Enayat and Visser (unpublished) with help of the "low basis theo-
rem" of computability theory to arithmetize their model-theoretic proof of conservativity
of CT−[PA] over PA. The proof presented here, however, is based on a simpler arithme-
tization of the Enayat–Visser construction and does not appeal to the low basis theorem;
the syntactic analysis of this arithmetization forms one of the main ingredients of the
proof of our main result.
We also employ the machinery developed for the proof of our main result to analyse
two other prominent theories of truth, namely FS−[PA] (Friedman–Sheard theory of truth
overPA, with no extra induction), andKF−[PA] (Kripke–Feferman theory of truth overPA
with no extra induction). More specifically, we show that FS−[PA] and KF−[PA] are both
reflexive and feasibly reducible to PA. These results, in turn, show that both FS−[PA] and
KF−[PA] are interpretable in PA and have at most polynomial speed-up over PA.
A word about the organization of the paper is in order. Section 2 deals with arith-
metical preliminaries and technical machinery that will be employed for establishing our
principal results. Section 3 presents basic definitions and facts about the truth theories
CT−[PA], KF−[PA], and FS−[PA], including their conservativity over PA. The main results
of the paper are contained in Section 4, which contains the proofs of feasible reduction
of CT−[PA], KF−[PA], and FS−[PA] to PA; these proofs should be viewed as refined arith-
metizations of the conservativity proofs presented in Section 3.3. The last subsection of
Section 4, on the other hand, spells out the interpretability-theoretic ramifications of our
work. Section 5 collects some open questions; and the Appendix (Section 6) consists of
routine-but-technical proofs of certain results employed in the body of the paper.
2 Setting the stage: arithmetical machinery
This section discusses basic notions and fundamental machinery that can be generally
described as refined arithmetization of certain parts of proof theory and model theory that
play a key role in the statements and proofs of our main results in Section 4. Note, how-
ever that the material in Subsection 2.6 will be only employed in Subsection 4.4.
2.1 Arithmetized syntax
In this paper, PA denotes the theory using {0, S,+,×} as non-logical function symbols,
whose axioms consist of the axioms of Robinson’s Arithmetic Q together with the usual
induction scheme for the whole languageLPA of PA. Its intendedmodel are natural num-
bers N with addition, multiplication and successor functions. We will also denote N by
ω, typically when treating it as set of indices for some construction. Sometimes in this
paper, we will be referring to N or ω when working in PA. Then these symbols simply
refer to the whole universe. This should not lead to any confusion.
Crucially for our purposes, PA is capable of representing syntax. This means that in
PA, one can employ recursion to define notions such as "term," "formula" or "proof in
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PA" similarly to how these notions are defined in Zermelo–Fränkel set theory. This is a
standard topic, covered, e.g., in [11] or [9].
Every sequence (w0, . . . , wn) ∈ {0, 1}
<ω is represented by a number
m =
n∑
i=0
2i(wi + 1).
Each formula is represented as a 0, 1-string and then coded as a number. If s is a binary
string, then |s| denotes its length.
Throughout the paperwewill use certain formulae to represent various syntactic and
technical notions. For the convenience of our reader,we gather here all the notationwhich
might be possibly confusing.
Definition 1 (Arithmetized syntax). 1. len(s) = x asserts: "s is a sequence and its
length is equal to x."
2. TermL(x) asserts: "x is a term of a languageL." For instance,TermLPA(x) asserts that
x is a (code of an) arithmetical term.
3. ClTermL(x) asserts: "x is a closed term of a language L," i.e. a term without free
variables.
4. TermSeqL(x) asserts: "x is a sequence of terms of the language L."
5. ClTermSeqL(x) asserts: "x is a sequence of closed terms of the language L."
6. x◦ = y asserts: "ClTermL(x) and y is the value of the term x." For instance,
p1 + ((1 + 1) + 0)q◦ = 3,
holds provably in PA (ptq stands for the number coding the term t).
7. Var(x) asserts: "x is a variable." For instance, Var(17) means that 17 is a code of a
variable in the coded language. Since without loss of generality we can assume that
all first-order languages have the same set of variables, we omit the reference to a
specific language in the subscript.
8. FormL(x) asserts: "x is a formula of the language L."
9. FV(x, y) asserts: "y is a free variable of x," where x is either a term or a formula.
10. Form≤1L (x) asserts: "x is a formula of the language L with at most one free vari-
able", and Form1L(x) asserts: "x is a formula of the language Lwith exactly one free
variable."
11. SentL(x) asserts: "x is a sentence of the language L."
12. FVSeq(x, y) asserts: "y is a (coded) sequence whose elements are (some) free vari-
ables of x," where x is either a term or a formula.
13. α is an assignment for a formula or a term φ if α is a function whose domain in-
cludes the free variables of φ. The formula Asn(x, y) asserts: "y is an assignment
for x," where x is a term or a formula. We will often denote it with y ∈ Asn(x).
If s is a coded set or sequence, we will write y ∈ Asn(s) to denote that y is an as-
signment for all elements of s. We will sometimes also write Asn(x1, . . . , xn, α) or
α ∈ Asn(x1, . . . , xn)meaning α ∈ Asn(s), where s = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉
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14. β ∼v α asserts: "α and β are assignments, v is a variable, and α(w) = β(w) for
all variables w, possibly except for v which belongs to the domain of β (and not
necessarily to the domain of α)."
The reader could expect to see in this list certain other predicates such as Proof or
Con. Since we will need some more precise information about these formulae and their
length, they will be only introduced in Subsection 2.3.
Next we introduce numerals. For our purposes the numeral x for a number x will
not be a code of S . . . S0 iterated x times, since this is not an efficient notation when it
comes to writing short formulae and proofs. Our numerals will be handled via binary
expansions.
Definition 2 (Numerals). For any natural number n, n denotes the binary expansion of
nwritten as a term of T . More precisely: let n =
∑
i≤k εi2
i, where εi ∈ {0, 1}. We define:
n = ε0 + 2× (ε1 + 2× (. . . εk−1 + 2× εk) . . .)
where 0 = 0, 1 = S(0) and 2 = 1 + 1. Thus it takes O(log n) symbols to represent n.
Let us introduce one more definition:
Definition 3 (Substitutions). 1. Let φ(v1, . . . , vn) be a formula with n free variables
shown and letα be an assingment for φ. By φ[α]we denote the formula in which the
numeral (in the sense of Definition 2) denoting α(vi) is substituted for the variable
vi.
2. Similarly, if t ∈ TermL and α ∈ Asn(t), then by t[α] we mean the closed term ob-
tained by substituting the numeral α(v) for each free variable v in t.
3. If t ∈ TermL and α ∈ Asn(t), then by t
α we mean t[α]◦. Notice that if v is a variable
and α ∈ Asn(v), then vα = α(v) provably in PA.
4. If x ∈ FormL for some language L, v ∈ Var and t ∈ TermL, then x[t/v] = y is an
arithmetical formula which asserts "y is the effect of substituting in the formula x
the term t for every occurrence of the variable v."
We adopt a few conventions as to how we will be dealing with formalized syntactic
notions.
Convention 4. 1. If φ is a standard formula or a standard term, we will sometimes
denote the corresponding code by pφq to prevent ambiguity, but most of the time
we skip the corners to lighten the notation.
2. We can clearly code a formula φ as a binary string. Then by |φ| we mean the length
of this string. Note that pφq is of size exponential in |φ| and pφq is of size linear in
|φ|. We deal with proofs in T in a similar fashion.
3. Since wewill sometimes skip the corners denoting formulae, pφq is most of the time
denoted by φ for a standard formula φ.
4. We will sometimes use the formulae defining syntactic notions as if they were de-
noting sets. For example, we will sometimes write "x ∈ FormLPA" rather than
"FormLPA(x)."
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5. We will use provably functional formulae such as x, x◦, or x[t/v] as if they were
terms.
6. For better readability we will sometimes skip formulae denoting syntactic opera-
tions andwrite the effect of the operations instead. Thus, for example, wewill write
T (¬φ) to denote "There exists ψ which is the negation of the sentence φ and T (ψ)."
2.2 Arithmetized model theory
Peano arithmetic is capable of accommodating a substantial part of the model theory of
countable structures. We will make constant use of this fact throughout the whole paper.
This subsection briefly introduces the reader to this topic. The rough convention is as
follows: a theory is a definable set of sentences. If φ is a formula which defines a set of
(codes of) sentences, then we call that formula a theory.
Models come in two kinds. By a full modelMwemean the elementary diagram of that
model (or, actually, a formula defining the elementary diagram). It is given as a complete
Henkinized theory. By a model M, we mean a formula defining its domain and some
relations on that domain (this does not mean that we only deal with models of relational
languages, but rather, we construe the denotations of function and constant symbols as
relations).
Definition 5. A formula φ defines a theory in a language L if for all x, φ(x)→
(
x ∈ SentL
)
holds. By a full model of a theory T , we mean a theory T ′ ⊇ T in a language L′ expanding
Lwith some constants (possibly trivially) such that:
• T ′ is complete and consistent, so for any φ, φ ∈ T ′ if and only if ¬φ /∈ T ′.
• T ′ has all existential statementswitnessedby constantswhichmeans that if ∃xφ(x) ∈
T ′, then for some constant c, φ(c) ∈ T ′.
By a model of a language L (or simply an L-structure), we mean a formulaM which
defines a set of (coded) sequences such that ifM(s), then:
• s(0) is either a symbol of the language L or some fixed element d which is not a
symbol of L.
• If s(0) is a relation symbol of L, then the length of s is the arity of s(0) plus one.
• If s(0) is a function symbol of L, then the length of s is the arity of s(0) plus two.
We treat constants as functions of arity zero.
• If s(0) is the fixed element d, then s has length two.
• If a = s(n) for some n > 0, thenM(〈d, a〉) holds. (a is in the domain of a model.)
In the above, a model is essentially defined as a particular kind of tuple: (definition of
the domain, definition of the first relation, definition of the second relation . . .). However,
since we allow models with infinite signatures, we define it in the above compact way
rather than an actual tuple of formulae. However, if a model is defined with a standard
number of definable relations, we can easily construct a definition in the format specified
above. The second warning is as follows: although officially in this paper a full model
is the same as the elementary diagram of that model, in practice, we will refer to models
in the usual way, since it is clear how to transfer statements about models to statements
about their elementary diagrams and vice versa.
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Definition 6. 1. If M is a full model, we write x ∈ M to say that x is a constant in
the language of a full modelM. (This means that x is an element ofM, since we
implicitly assume that all full models are built on Henkin constants.) If M is a
model, the expressions x ∈M , means thatM(d, x) holds.
2. IfM is a (full) model over a language L, and φ ∈ FormL, we say that α is an M-
assignment or anM-valuation for a formulaφ ifα is a (coded) finite function, whose
domain contains FV(φ), α ∈ Asn(φ), and for every x, α(x) ∈ M . We denote this by
α ∈ Asn(φ,M).
3. IfM is a full model over a language L, φ ∈ FormL, and α is anM-assignment, then
the relationM |= φ[α] is defined simply as φ(α(x1), . . . , α(xc)) ∈ M.
4. If M is a model over a language L, φ ∈ FormL, and α is an M-assignment, then
the relation M |= φ[α] is defined only for φ of standard complexity via the usual
compositional conditions with quantifiers restricted to the domain ofM and satis-
faction for base relations R ∈ L (of arity c) defined as follows:
M |= R[α] iffM
(
〈R,α(v1), . . . , α(vc)〉
)
.
We define satisfaction for equalities of terms in an analogous fashion.
5. IfM is a full model, wewill write ElDiag(M) (elementary diagram ofM) instead of
Mwhenwewant to stress thatwe are thinking of a theory rather than of a structure.
6. IfM is a (full) model over a language L, a1, . . . , ac ∈ M and φ(v1, . . . , vc) is a for-
mula with the displayed free variables, we will write
M |= φ(a1, . . . , ac)
meaning there there exists anM-valuation α for φ such that α(vi) = ai for all i < c
andM |= φ[α].
7. If M is a (full) model over a language L and φ(v1, . . . , vc) ∈ FormL with all free
variables displayed, then by φ(M) we mean the set of (tuples of) elements defined
by the formula φ in M. In other words, it is the set of tuples (a1, . . . , ac) of the
elements ofM such thatM |= φ[α] for some (equivalently, any) α ∈ Asn(φ) such
that α(vi) = ai, i ≤ c.
Note that we haven’t yet defined what it means that a model satisfies a theory. This
is not an omission. Since for general (not full) models, satisfaction is defined only for
standard sentences, we only define satisfaction for standard formulae. This is actually a
scheme: for each formula we define what it means that a model satisfies this formula.
More precisely: for each n ∈ N, we define what it means that a model satisfies a formula
of depth n.
On the other hand, in our paper, non-full models will play a crucial role and in some
specific circumstances we are going to say that a model satisfies a theory. This will be
defined in some specific cases of our interest later in Definition 29.
Let us define somemore notions which will be particularly important in further parts
of our paper.
Definition 7. LetM,N be full models of theories in the same language. We say that N
is an elementary extension ofM ifM is contained in N .
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Recall that officially, a full model is the same as the elementary diagram of thatmodel,
so elementary submodels in our sense correspond to elementary submodels in the usual
sense. In what follows, we will sometimes conflate an elementary submodel with an image
of the elementary embedding. This should be understood in the obvious way: a formula
φ(x, y) defines an elementary embedding betweenmodelsM andN if it is a injection on
elements of the modelsM,N (i.e., it is a relation on constants such that φ(a, b1), φ(a, b2)
together imply (b1 = b2) ∈ N and φ(a1, b), φ(a2, b) together imply that (a1 = a2) ∈ M)
and the image is an elementary submodel ofM (i.e, the restriction of N to the language
with constants representing the image ofM is a full model).
We will denote both being an elementary submodel and being an image of an ele-
mentary embedding with
M N .
Sometimes we only require that the elementarity relation only holds for formulae in a
language L such thatM,N are full models over a language containing L. We then write:
ML N .
Crucially, in this paper we will be looking at the situation whereM is a full model, N
is a (non-full) model over a bigger language and N is an L-elementary extension ofM.
This is a slightly subtler notion which will be made precise in Definition 30.
Definition 8. LetM,N be models or full models in languages LM, LN respectively. We
say thatN is an expansion ofM if the following conditions are satisfied:
• LM ⊆ LN .
• For every element a ∈ N there is an element b ∈M such that N |= x = y[α], where
α(x) = a, α(y) = b. (That is, the domain does not change. Wewrite it in this slightly
convoluted manner, since we want the definition to work both for models and full
models).
• For every atomic formula φ ∈ LM and M-assignment α for φ, M |= φ[α] if and
only if N |= φ[α].
We can say that PA is capable of handling basicmodel theory, since it is able to capture
the link between models and consistent theories. In the context of our definitions, this
means that in PA every consistent theory can be extended to a complete consistent theory
with Henkin constants.
Theorem 9 (Arithmetized Completeness Theorem). For every n ∈ N, PA proves that if T is
a consistent ∆n-theory, then it has a∆n+1-full model.
By ∆n-theory, we mean a set of sentences defined both with a Σn-formula and a Πn-
formula. ∆n+1-fullmodel is defined in an analogousway. The above theorem is standard,
cf. Section 13.2 of Kaye’s book [11]. Throughout the paper, wewill be using the following
handy conventions concerning models:
Convention 10. 1. When there is no risk of confusion, we will use the same symbol
for a predicate symbol and for its denotation in a given (full) model.
2. We will sometimes denote (full) models as tuples, like (M, T ). This will simply
mean that (M, T ) is an expansion ofM with a predicate T .
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2.3 Lengths of proofs
This section summarizes the basic definitions and tools that we will need in connection
with analysing lengths of proofs; much of this material is taken from Pudlák’s survey
article [18].
Definition 11. Recall that |φ| denotes the length of binary code of φ and pφq is its Gödel
number (which we denote as φ by our Convention 4).
1. Let φ be an LT -formula.
‖ φ ‖T =
{
the length of the shortest proof of φ, if T ⊢ φ;
∞ otherwise.
(1)
2. If ‖ φ ‖T ≤ n, we write also
T ⊢n φ.
We treat theories simply as sets of sentences, not necessarily closed under deductions.
This is because changing the axiomatization of a theorymight result in facilitating proofs.
Definition 12 (Simulations, Speed-up, Reducibility). Let T1 and T2 be two theories and
F a family of functions f : N → N. We shall say that T1 F-simulates T2 iff there exists a
function f ∈ F such that for every sentence φ ∈ LT1 ∩LT2 that is provable in both T1 and
T2, and for every n ∈ N, we have:
T2 ⊢
n φ⇒ T1 ⊢
f(n) φ.
We say that T2 isF-reducible to T1 if there exists a function f ∈ F such that for every n ∈ N
we have:
n is a proof of φ in T2 ⇒ f(n) is a proof of φ in T1.
We say that T2 has a super-F speed-up over T1 if T1 does not F-simulate T2.
Typical examples in the literature of speed-up (simulability) phenomena concern the
cases where F is the family of either polynomial or elementary functions, which re-
spectively correspond to super-polynomial speed-up (or polynomial simulation) and super-
exponential (or super-elementary) speed-up.
Remark 13. The main focus of our paper is the relation of F-reducibility, where F is the
family of all P-time computable functions. Recall that f is a P-time computable function
if it is a total function such that for each n (the binary code of) f(n) can be computed by
a deterministic Turing machine which takes as input (the binary code of) n (see [9] for
the precise formulation) and which runs in polynomial time. We call this relation feasible
reducibility.
The proofs of the following observations are routine:
Observation 14. Let F be any family of functions from N to N.
1. If T2 isF-reducible to T1, then T1 F-simulates T2. Moreover if T2 is feasibly reducible
to T1, then T1 polynomially simulates T2.
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2. If F is countable, then T2 has a super F speed-up over T1 if there exists an infinite
sequence of formulae φ0, φ1, . . . , provable in both T1 and T2 such that for every
function f ∈ F there exists n ∈ N such that
‖ φn ‖T1> f(‖ φn ‖T2).
The most prominent role in the investigations in the lengths of proofs is played by
consistency statements. We shall now discuss arithmetized provability. Recall that |n|
denotes the length of the binary expansion of n.
Definition 15 (Pudlák, [17]). Let T be a theory, φ(x0, . . . , xn) be a formula and R ⊆ N
k+1
be a relation. We say that φ polynomially numerates R in T if there exists a polynomial
p(x0, . . . , xk) such that for all natural numbers n0, . . . , nk
R(n0, . . . , nk) iff ‖ φ(n0, . . . , nk) ‖T ≤ p(|n0|, . . . , |nk|).
Theorem 16 (Pudlák, [17] Theorem 3.2). For any consistent theory T ⊇ Q with an NP-time
set of axioms5 and any R ⊆ Nk the following are equivalent:
1. R is an NP-time relation;
2. R is polynomially numerable in Q;
3. R is polynomially numerable in T .
Since on hand in our paper, we want slightly stronger results concerning feasible re-
ducibility between theories rather than mere facts about speed-up, and on the other, we
workwith relatively strong theories anyway, wewill use amodification of Pudlák’s result,
(which actually is simpler than the original theorem).
Definition 17. Let T be a theory, φ(x0, . . . , xn) be a formula and R ⊆ N
k+1 be a rela-
tion. We say that φ uniformly polynomially numerates R in T if there exists a P-time com-
putable function f such that for all natural numbers n0, . . . , nk, R(n0, . . . , nk) holds iff
f(n0, . . . , nk) is a proof of φ(n0, . . . , nk) in T .
In what follows, we need only the following simple fact which may be proved by a
natural formalisation of Turing Machines in I∆0 + Exp. It is significantly simpler than
Pudlák’s result, since we do not need to consider cuts or use cut-shortening techniques.
Theorem 18. For any consistent theory T ⊇ I∆0 + Exp with a set of axioms computable in
polynomial time, and any R ⊆ Nk the following are equivalent:
1. R is a P-time relation;
2. R is uniformly polynomially numerable in I∆0 + Exp;
3. R is uniformly polynomially numerable in T .
5An NP-time set or relation is one whose characteristic function can be computed by a non-deterministic
Turing machine that runs in polynomial time.
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Corollary 19. Let T be a theory with a P-time set of axioms. Then there exists a formalization of
the relation
ProofT (x, y) := "x is a proof of y from the axioms of T "
and a polynomially computable function f(n) such that
N |= ProofT (m,n),
implies that f(n,m) is a proof of ProofT (m,n) in I∆0 + Exp.
Moreover, we define formulae Con and Pr in the usual manner as follows:
PrT (y) := ∃xProofT (x, y)
and
ConT := ¬PrT (∃x(x 6= x)).
If not stated otherwise, throughout this paper T , and Ti for i ∈ N range over P-time
axiomatizable theories.
Remark 20 (Relativized provability predicates). The content of this remarkwill be needed
only in Section 4.4. The formalization of the provability predicate from Corollary 19 is of
the form: "There exists an accepting computation of the Turingmachinewhich recognizes
T proofs". Let φ(x) be any arithmetical formula. By writing
Proof
φ
T (x, y)
wemean the relativized version of the above predicate, i.e., the one in which the relevant
Turing machine is supplied with an oracle given by φ and recognizes the theorems of
T + φ (whatever φ means). We can treat T + φ as a new arithmetized theory, but then
in typical cases it won’t be ∆1. This is why we decide to distinguish between the roles
played by the lower and the upper indices in ProofφT (x, y): the former will be reserved for
theories satisfying the thesis of Corollary 19 and the latter for arbitrary formulae, playing
the roles of oracles. Obviously the relativized version of Corollary 19 need not be true,
but we will only demand that the following two conditions hold:
1. There exists a P-time computable function f such that for alln and all φ(x), f(n, pφq, pT q)
is a PA proof of
(φ(n)→ ProofφT (n, n)), (RelProv1)
where T denotes the chosen arithmetical definition of T .
2. Likewise, there exists a P-time computable function g such that g(pφq, pψq, pT q) is
a PA proof of the sentence
∀x (φ(x)→ ψ(x))→ ∀y∀z
(
Proof
φ
T (y, z)→ Proof
ψ
T (y, z)
)
. (RelProv2)
This requires that ProofφT (y, z) be constructed uniformly in φ, which can certainly
be assured.
In particular, ProofφT (x, y) is of length polynomial in the lengths of φ and the chosen def-
inition of T . As usual
Pr
φ
T (y) := ∃xProof
φ
T (x, y)
and
Con
φ
T := ¬Pr
φ
T (∃x(x 6= x)).
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The following theorem gives a canonical example of a family of sentences whose
proofs grow super-exponentially. Let PrT (m,n) denote the canonical sentence express-
ing "there is a proof of sentence n from the axioms of T of length at most m." Then
ConT (m) := ¬PrT (m, 0 = 1).
Theorem 21 (Pudlák,[18], Theorem 7.2.2). Let T be a sufficiently strong theory. Let f be an
increasing computable function, provably total in T , whose graph has a polynomial numeration
in T . Then there exists a δ > 0 such that
‖ ConT (f(n)) ‖T > f(n)
δ.
In particular, for f(n) := 2n, where 20 := 1, and 2n+1 := 2
2n , there is some some δ > 0
such that:
‖ ConIΣ1(2n) ‖IΣ1 > 2
δ
n;
‖ ConPA(2n) ‖PA > 2
δ
n.
2.4 Feasible truth predicates
Nowwe turn to arithmetized partial truth predicates, whichwewant to apply to arbitrary
sentences of fixed complexity, defined here in a way that is different from the usual one
(i.e.,Σn,Πn). Themeasure of complexitywill be given by the depth of formulae, as defined
below.
Definition 22. The depth of a formula is the length of the longest path in its syntactic tree
(which is allowed to contain arbitrary terms as leaves). dp(φ, n) denotes an arithmetical
formula representing the relation "The depth of a formula φ is at most n." We will also
write it as dp(φ) ≤ n.
For example 0 = 0 ∧ ∀x¬(SSS(x) = 0) has depth 3.
To state some results in greater generality we will use Pudlák’s notion of sequential
theories (since there seems to be more than one good definition of sequentiality, we in-
clude Pudlák’s definition):
Definition 23 (Pudlák, [17]). A theory T is sequential, if
1. Robinson’s arithmetic Q is interpretable in T relativized to some formula N(x) of
LT and
2. there exists a formula (x)t (of two variables x, t) that defines in T a total function
(in both variables) and such that T proves
∀x, y, t∃z (N(t)→ ∀s < t ((x)s = (z)s ∧ (z)t = y))
Now the promised "feasible" partial truth predicates:
Theorem 24 (Pudlák, [18], Theorem 3.3.1). Let T be a sequential theory. There is a family of
formulae Satn(x, y) ∈ LT and a polynomial q(x) such that for every n there exists a T -proof of
compositional Tarski’s conditions for Satn(x, y) such that the size of that proof is less than q(n).
Moreover for every φ(x1, . . . , xk) of length less than n, the shortest T proof of
∀α ∈ Asn(φ)
(
Satn(φ, α) ≡ φ(α)
)
is less than q(n).
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Moreover, by inspection of Pudlák’s proof one quickly sees that in fact finding the
above mentioned proofs of polynomial length is feasible. This means that the above the-
orem can be slightly strengthened as in the theorem below.
Theorem 25. Let T be a sequential theory. There is a family of formulae Satn(x, y) ∈ LT and
P-time computable functions f(x), g(x, y) such that for every n, f(n) is a T proof of composi-
tional Tarski’s conditions for Satn(x, y). Moreover for every φ(x1, . . . , xk) of length less than n,
g(pφq, n) is a T -proof of
∀α ∈ Asn(φ)
(
Satn(φ, α) ≡ φ(α)
)
.
In what follows, Trn(x) abbreviates Satn(x,∅).
Observation 26. There exists a P-time computable function f such that for every k ≤ n,
f(n, k) is a proof in PA of
∀φ ∈ SentLPA dp(φ) ≤ k →
(
Trn(φ) ≡ Trk(φ)
)
.
The proof uses induction (in PA) on the complexity of φ and provable Tarski bicondi-
tionals for Trl predicates.
In further parts of the paper, we will also need the relativized version of the Theorem
25 (we state it only for PA). IfM is a∆k-model (not necessarily a full one) for a language
L′ with finitely many fresh non-arithmetical relational symbols, then by M-relativized
Tarski’s conditions for a formulaΦ(x, y)wemean the usual statement thatΦ(x, y) satisfies
Tarski’s compositional truth conditions in which the condition for atomic formulae is:
∀α ∈ Asn(φ,M) Φ(pR(s0, . . . , sn−1)q, α) ≡M |= R(s0, . . . , sn−1)[α]
for an arbitrary relation R in L′, and the condition for the existential quantifier is given
by
∀v ∈ Var∀φ(v) ∈ FormL′∀α ∈ Asn(φ,M) Φ(∃vφ, α) ≡ ∃β ∼v α
(
β ∈ Asn(φ,M)∧Φ(φ, β)
)
.
Corollary 27. Let M be any ∆k-model. There is a family of formulae Sat
M
n (x, y) ∈ FormL
and P-time computable functions f(x, y), g(x, y, z) such that for every n, f(pMq, n) is a PA-
proof of theM-relativized compositional Tarski’s conditions for SatMn (x, y). Moreover for every
φ(x1, . . . , xk) of length less than n, g(pMq, pφq, n) is a PA-proof of
∀α ∈ Asn(φ,M)
(
SatMn (φ, α) ≡M |= φ(α(x1), . . . , α(xn))
)
.
The family SatMn (x, y) can be defined essentially by relativizing Satn(x, y) predicates
fromTheorem24. Since thedefinitionofMdoesnot dependonn, the lengthofSatMn (x, y)
will be polynomial in n.
As above, we will write TrMn to denote satisfaction under the empty valuation. Occa-
sionally, we will use the handy notational convention described below.
Convention 28. If φ(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Form is a formula with standardly many many vari-
ables, we will be writing Satk(φ, a1, . . . , an) to denote
Satk(φ, α),
where α ∈ Asn(φ) is some valuation which assigns a1, . . . an to the variables (v1, . . . , vn).
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Let us end this subsectionwith a definition of satisfaction of theories for a larger class
of models.
Definition 29. Let n ∈ N. LetM |= B be a model over a language L and let (M, T ) be its
expansion to an L′-structure. Suppose that T is a theory over the language L′ such that
T \ B consists only of sentences of depth≤ n. We say that
(M, T ) |= T
if (M, T ) |= Trn(φ) for all φ ∈ T \ SentL.
The above definition is actually a scheme. We define separately for all standard n
what it means for an expanded structure to satisfy a theory whose axioms have depth
bounded by n. Note that whenever (M, T ) is an expansion of a full modelM |= B and
T extends B with finitely many standard sentences φ1, . . . , φn, the condition (M, T ) |= T
means simply that (M, T ) |= φi for i ≤ n. Let us introduce one more definition in the
similar spirit.
Definition 30. LetM,N |= B, where B is a theory over language L. Let T be a theory
over language L′ such that T \ B consists only of sentences of depth ≤ n. Suppose that
(N , T ) |= T is an expansion ofN . We say that (N , T ) is an L-elementary extension ofM
if N is an elementary extension ofM. We denote it with
ML (N , T ).
2.5 Polynomial simulations and feasible reductions for theories extending
PA.
Let us fix T2 ⊇ T1 ⊇ PA such that T2 conservatively extends T1. It turns out that in order to
verify that T2 is feasibly reducible to T1 it is sufficient to demonstrate that the formalized
conservativity statements for finite fragments of T2 over finite fragments of T1 are feasibly
provable in T1. The theorem below makes this precise.
6 Before stating the theorem, we
need a definition.
Definition 31. Let T be a theory. By T ↾n we mean the set of axioms of T of length at
most n. Abusing notation, we treat T ↾n as the canonical formula representing T ↾n in
I∆0 + Exp.
Theorem 32. Let T be a theory extending PA with an NP-set of axioms. If there is a polynomial
p(n) such that for every n ∈ N,
PA ⊢p(n) ∀φ ∈ SentLPA
(
dp(φ) ≤ n ∧ PrT ↾n(φ)→ PrPA↾p(n)(φ)
)
,
then PA polynomially simulates T . Moreover, if T admits a P-time computable set of axioms and
there exists a P-time computable function f and a polynomial p(n) such that for all n, f(n) is a
PA-proof of
∀φ ∈ SentLPA
(
dp(φ) ≤ n ∧ PrT ↾n(φ)→ PrPA↾p(n)(φ)
)
,
then T is feasibly reducible to PA.
6We are grateful to Fedor Pakhomov who pointed out to us that this is the most direct way of proving
our main results. Our previous proofs employed the conceptually more transparent—but technically more
demanding—framework of feasible interpretations, as explained in Subsection 4.4.
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Recall that dp(φ) is the height of the syntactic tree of φ and that we use this symbol
for the arithmetic formula representing this function. The proof of Theorem 32 will be
facilitated by the following lemma which shows that PA is feasibly strongly reflexive.
Lemma 33. There exists a P-time computable function f such that for every n, k ∈ N, f(n, k) is
a PA proof of:
∀φ ∈ SentLPA
(
dp(φ) ≤ k ∧ PrPA↾n(φ)→ Trk(φ)
)
.
Proof of Lemma 33. The proof follows the usual pattern, but we have to check that each
transformation at work is feasible. Here we provide the general outline; the details are
verified carefully in Subsection 6.1 of the Appendix. Assume first that n ≤ k. Working in
PA, we first prove cut-elimination for First Order Logic (this is a single sentence indepen-
dent of n). Then we show that every axiom of PA of length ≤ n is true. For finitely many
axioms of Robinson’s Q, this is done independently of n. For induction axioms of length
at most n we use Proposition 80, and for logical axioms we use Proposition 79. Next we
apply cut-elimination over First Order Logic to show that for a sentence φ of depth ≤ k
if PrPA↾n(φ), then there is a cut-free proof of a sequent
Γ −→ φ,
whereΓ contains only axioms ofPA ↾n. By the subformula property, in such a proof every
formula is of depth bounded by k. Then, using induction on the number of proof lines
in a proof using only formulae of depth at most k, we show that if
Γ −→ ∆
is provable, then we have:
∀α
(
α ∈ Asn(Γ ∪∆) ∧ ∀x ∈ Γ Satk(x, α)→ ∃y ∈ ∆ Satk(y, α)
)
,
where α ∈ Asn(Γ ∪∆) abbreviates ∀x ∈ Γ ∪∆ α ∈ Asn(x), as in Definition 1. Since we
already know that all PA ↾n axioms are true, we conclude that φ is true.
If k ≤ n, then it is sufficient to carry out the above proof substituting n for k every-
where and use Observation 26. Note that all the transformations above are uniform in
n, k, hence in particular they give rise to a function f as in the thesis of the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 32. Assume T ⊢n φ and φ ∈ LPA. Then in fact T ↾n⊢ φ and φ is of depth
at most n. Let k code this proof. Then, by the properties of the provability predicate we
have:
PA ⊢ ProofT ↾n(k, φ).
Hence alsoPA ⊢ PrT ↾n(φ). By the formalized conservativitywehave thatPA ⊢ PrPA↾p(n)(φ);
by Lemma 33, we have PA ⊢ Trp(n)(φ); and by feasibly provable T -biconditionals (Theo-
rem 24) we obtain PA ⊢ φ. All the intermediate steps are polynomial in n.
Also, if T has a P-time computable axiomatization, by Corollary 19 there exists a P-
time computable function h such that given a proof k ∈ T of a formula φ, h(k) is the proof
of the sentence
ProofT (k, φ).
Given a function f as in our assumptions and the function f ′ as in Lemma 33 one easily
defines the appropriate feasible reduction by concatenating the proofs given by f , f ′ and
h as in the proof for polynomial simulation.
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Corollary 34. Suppose that there exists a polynomial p(n) and there is a k ∈ N such that for
every n ∈ N, PA ⊢p(n) θn, where θn expresses "Every ∆2-full model of PA ↾p(n) has an LPA-
elementary extension to a full∆k-model of T ↾n." Then PA polynomially simulates T . Moreover,
if T is P-time, and there exists a P-time function f such that for all n ∈ N, f(n) is a PA-proof of
θn, then T is feasibly reducible to PA.
Let us make one remark before we proceed to the proof of Corollary 34. Recall from
Subsection 2.2 that in the current paper we treat full models as specific arithmetically
definable sets of sentences. Note that although we cannot quantify over models in general, we
can do this for models of fixed quantifier complexity using arithmetical satisfaction predicates.
Proof of Corollary 34. Fix k and polynomial p. We shall prove the assumptions of Theorem
32. Fix n. Start the proof by showing θn using a subproof of length p(n). Then fix φ of
depth ≤ n and assume:
¬PrPA↾p(n)(φ).
It immediately follows that PA ↾p(n) +¬φ is consistent. We check that this is a∆1-theory
(this verification is polynomial in the definition of PA ↾p(n) +¬φ, hence polynomial in n).
We prove the ArithmetizedCompleteness Theorem9 for∆1-theories; this is independent
of n and gives us a∆2-full model of PA ↾p(n) +¬φ. Now, by θn, this model has an elemen-
tary extension to a full model of T ↾n. By elementarity T ↾n +¬φ is consistent, which
ends the feasible proof of the conservativity claim.
The proof of moreover part of the theorem is fully analogous: we apply it to the re-
spective part of Theorem 32.
Corollary 35. Suppose there is a polynomial p(n) and there is a k ∈ N such that for every
n ∈ N, PA ⊢p(n) θn, where θn expresses "Every∆2-full model of PA ↾p(n) has an LPA-elementary
extension to a ∆k-model of T ↾n." Then PA polynomially simulates T . Moreover, if T is P-time
and there exists a P-time computable function f such that for all n, f(n) is a PA-proof of θn, then
T is feasibly reducible to PA.
Note that above LPA-elementary extensions are understood in the sense of Definition
30.
Proof. We show that the above assumption implies the assumption of the previous corol-
lary. Fix T . Take p(n) and k as in the assumptions. Work in PA. Fix an arbitrary ∆2-full
modelM of PA ↾p(n). Then there exists a ∆k-model N |= T ↾n which is an elementary
extension ofM. We argue that the∆2-theory
Φ := ElDiag(M) ∪ T ↾n
is consistent. This will finish the proof, since by Arithmetized Completeness Theorem
we will get a∆3-full model of this theory (the length of this subproof is polynomial in n
as the proof of ACT is independent of n).
Take an arbitrary proof π of a sentence φ inΦ and prove cut-elimination for first order
logic (the length of this proof is independent of n) and conclude that there exists a proof
π′ of φ in Φ with the subformula property. It follows that every formula in this proof
is either an arithmetical formula or is a subformula of an additional axiom of T ↾n. In
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particular non-arithmetical formulae which occur in this proof are of depth bounded by
n. Define:
Sat(x, y) := x ∈ FormLPA ∧M |= x[y] ∨
(
x /∈ FormLPA ∧ Sat
N
n (x, y)
)
,
where SatNn (x, y) is a feasible relativized truth predicate from Corollary 27. By induction
on the length of π′ show that if Γ −→ ∆ occurs in π′, then for every α
(∀x ∈ Γ Sat(x, α))→
(
∃x ∈ ∆ Sat(x, α)
)
.
It follows that π′ cannot be a proof of the empty sequent, hence Φ is consistent.
The following is the ultimate corollary that best fits the proofs of our main results:
Corollary 36. Suppose that T is a finite extension of PA of the form PA + φ, k ∈ N and the
following sentence is provable in PA:
"If B is any finite fragment of PA, then every ∆2-full model of B has an LPA elementary
extension to a∆k-model of B + φ."
Then T is feasibly reducible to PA.
Proof. The assumptions of Corollary 36 clearly implies that the assumptions of Corol-
lary 35, as the verification that B is a ∆1-finite fragment of PA can be done quickly and
uniformly in n.
We will end this subsection with two simple observations which may be obtained
by inspection of the proof of Theorem 32 and the proof of subsequent corollaries. They
provide some slightly different sufficient condition for feasible reducibility. Observation
38 will be useful in Subsection 4.3.
Observation 37. Suppose that T is a theory with a P-time set of axioms which is PA-
provably feasibly strongly reflexive, i.e., there exists a P-time computable function h such
that for each n, k ∈ N, h(n, k) is a PA proof of the sentence
∀φ ∈ SentLPA
(
dp(φ) ≤ k ∧ PrT ↾n(φ)→ Trk(φ)
)
. (*)
Then T is feasibly reducible to PA.
Observation 38. Suppose that T satisfies assumptions of Corollary 35 (with the "more-
over" part) or Corollary 36. Then T is PA-provably feasibly strongly reflexive.
Proof. By (very direct) inspection of proofs of Corollaries 35 and 36, we see that if T satis-
fies assumptions of any of these statements, then there exists a P-time computable func-
tion f and a polynomial p(n) such that for each n ∈ N, f(n) is a PA-proof of
∀φ ∈ SentLPA
(
dp(φ) ≤ n ∧ PrT ↾n(φ)→ PrPA↾p(n)(φ)
)
. (2)
It follows that T is PA-provably feasibly strongly reflexive. Indeed , fix the above men-
tioned function f , polynomial p and gwitnessing the feasible reflexivity of PA. We define
h(n, k). Compute first f(n), then compute g(p(n), k), i.e. the proof of
∀φ ∈ SentLPA
(
dp(φ) ≤ k ∧ PrPA↾p(n)(φ)→ Trk(φ)
)
.
Then after performing some fixed number of logical transformations obtain the proof of
*.
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2.6 Feasible interpretability and speed-up
This section presents sufficient conditions for feasible interpretability, a notion that will
be only used in Subsection 4.4. All the basic notions relied to relative interpretability can
be found in [9], Chapter III. We begin with an observation of Albert Visser, presented in
[7].7
Theorem 39. Suppose that T2 ⊇ T1, where both T1 and T2 are formulated in the language of PA
and T2 is finitely axiomatizable and relatively interpretable in T1. Then T1 polynomially simulates
T2 with respect to Π1-sentences.
The crucial insight in the proof of the above theorem is that relative interpretations are
always Π1-correct if the interpreting theory is an extension of PA in the same language,
i.e., for every Π1-sentence φ of LT1 we have:
T1 ⊢ φ
I → φ,
where I is the chosen relative interpretation of T2 in T1.
The next definition is formulated so as to allowus to lift theΠ1-correctness in Theorem
39 towider-and-wider class of sentences so as to establish polynomial simulations of non-
finitely axiomatizable theories.
Definition 40. Let T1, T2 be two theories each of which has an NP-set of axioms.
1. An interpretation I : T2 → T1 is n-correct if for an arbitrary sentence φ of depth n
we have:
T1 ⊢ φ
I → φ.
2. An interpretation I : T2 → T1 is feasible
8 if there is a polynomial p(n) such that for
all arbitrary sentences φ and all n ∈ N we have:
T2 ⊢
n φ⇒ T1 ⊢
p(n) φI .
3. A family of interpretations {In}n∈N : T2 → T1 is polynomially correct if for each n,
In is n-correct and there exists a polynomial p(n, k) such that the following two
conditions hold:
(a) p(n, k)witnesses that Ik is a feasible interpretation, i.e., for every k, n ∈ N, and
for every sentence φ of LT2 ,
T2 ⊢
n φ⇒ T1 ⊢
p(n,k) φIk .
.
7The formulationof the cited theorem is, however, is not quite right since it is claimed that it holdswithout
any restrictions on T2, which is incorrect, e.g., let sPA := PA + {ConPA(2n) | n ∈ N}. Then the identity
interpretation witnesses relative interpretability of sPA in PA, but the former theory has super-exponential
speed-up over the latter. However, with the proviso that T2 is fintiely axiomatizable the proof goes through.
Also the proof of our Proposition 42 can be easily adapted to this case.
8Feasible interpretations are thoroughly investigated in Verbrugge’s doctoral thesis [20]. In particular, as
shown in Theorem 6.4.2 of [20], there is a sentence θ such that PA+ θ is interpretable in PA, and yet there is
no feasible interpretation of PA + θ in PA.
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(b) For every k ∈ N and every sentence φ of length at most k,
T1 ⊢
p(k,k) φIk → φ.
4. A family of interpretations {In}n∈N : T2 → T1 is uniformly polynomially correct if for
each n, In is n-correct and there exist P-time computable functions f , g such that
the following two conditions hold:
(a) For every k ∈ N, and every T2-proof π of φ ∈ LT2 f(k, π) is a T1-proof of φ
Ik .
(b) For every k ∈ N, and every sentence φ of length at most k, g(k, pφq) is a T1-
proof of
φIk → φ.
Remark 41. In the context of theories with no additional rules of reasoning, condition (a)
in the definition of polynomial correctness (point 3.) can equivalently be replaced with
the following one
(a)’. For every k,
T1 ⊢
p(n,k) φIk ,
for every axiom φ of T2 (including the logical axioms for LT2) of length at most n.
(Analogously for the uniform version.) However, we prefer (a) over (a)’ as it can be used
in the context of theories such as FS− which is closed under two additional rules of rea-
soning: NEC and CONEC.
The proposition below follows simply by unravelling the relevant definitions:
Proposition 42. If there exists a polynomially correct family of interpretations {In}n∈N : T2 →
T1, then T1 polynomially simulates T2. Moreover, if {In}n∈N is a uniformly polynomially correct
family of interpretations, then T2 is feasibly reducible to T1.
Proof. Fix a polynomially correct family of interpretations {In}n∈N and let p(n, k) be a
polynomial witnessing this. Suppose that T2 ⊢
n φ for some φ ∈ LT2 ∩ LT1 . Then
• φ is of length at most n,
• every axiom of T2 which occurs in the proof is of length at most n, and
Hence, by Definition 40, T1 ⊢
p(n,n) φIn . Since In is n-correct, we have that
T1 ⊢
O(p(n,n)) φ.
The moreover part is fully analogous.
Remark 43. By the inspection of the proof one quickly realizes that in fact the require-
ments for the family {In}n∈N can be relaxed even further. We do not have to demand that
each In interprets the whole theory T2, instead we can make the weaker demand that
there is a polynomial p(n) such that for every nwe have:
In : T2 ↾n→ T1 ↾p(n),
where T ↾n denotes the set of axioms of T of length at most n.
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3 Dramatis personæ: typed and untyped theories of truth
In this sectionBdenotesa "base theory" for a theory of truth, i.e., a theorywith amodicum
of arithmetic capable of handling syntax. For example any theory extending I∆0 + Exp
will do. T denotes a fresh unary predicate that is not in the language of B. LB denotes
the language of B and LT denotes the language of B enriched with the predicate T . For
simplicity assume that the signature ofLB extends the arithmetical signaturewith finitely
many relational symbols.
In this paper, we will be dealing with theories of truth conservative over their base
theories. We say that a theory T in the language LT is conservative over B ⊆ T if for
every sentence φ ∈ LB we have:
B ⊢ φ iff T ⊢ φ.
In our case, this means that adding the truth predicate and some axioms governing its
behaviour does not allow us to prove new arithmetical sentences.
Below, we discuss some prominent examples of truth theories. A standard reference
to the subject is Halbach’s book [10].
3.1 CT−
Definition 44. CT−[B] is the theory extending a theory B with the following sentences:
CT1 ∀s, t ∈ ClTermLB T (s = t) ≡ s
◦ = t◦.
CT2 ∀s1, . . . , sn ∈ ClTermLB TR(s1, . . . , sn) ≡ R(s1
◦, . . . , sn
◦), for every relational sym-
bol of LT .
CT3 ∀φ,ψ ∈ SentLB T (φ ∨ ψ) ≡ Tφ ∨ Tψ.
CT4 ∀φ ∈ SentLB T (¬φ) ≡ ¬Tφ.
CT5 ∀φ ∈ Form≤1LB∀v ∈ Var T (∃vφ) ≡ ∃xTφ(x).
CT6 ∀φ(x¯) ∈ FormLB∀s¯, t¯ ∈ ClTermSeqLB
(
s¯◦ = t¯◦ → Tφ[s¯/x¯] ≡ Tφ[t¯/x¯]
)
The last condition is sometimes called generalized regularity, or generalized term-extensionality.
It should resemble the well known extensionality rule from deductive calculi for first-
order logic, i.e.
s0 = t0, . . . , sk = tk, φ(s0, . . . , sk)
φ(t0, . . . , tk)
.
We include it since without it the quantifier axiom for CT− behaves in an unnatural way.9
For example, for B = PA we have:
PA + CT1 ∧ CT2 ∧ CT3 ∧ CT4 0 T∀xφ(x)→ ∀tTφ(t)
Obviously one can simply interchange the quantifier axiom with the following one:
T∃yφ(y) ≡ ∃tTφ(t).
9It behaves decently already after adding the ungeneralized version of CT6 for single terms.
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But then, without regularity, the following implication:
∀x Tφ(x)→ T∀yφ(y)
becomes unprovable. With the Regularity both quantifier axioms are easily seen to be
equivalent.
The above version of CT−[PA] was claimed to be conservative over PA in [21]. How-
ever, no proof of this fact was provided and only a hint that it requires a slight modifica-
tion of the Enayat and Visser construction (see [5]). This modification, however, adds a
layer of technical difficulty, so in the current version we prove feasible conservativity of
CT−[PA] in full detail. A detailed proof of conservativity of this theory is provided also
in [12].
3.2 KF− and FS−
The idea behind the untyped notion of truth is that the truth predicate can be meaning-
fully applied also to sentences containing it, to the effect that we could e.g., judge
T (p0 = 0q)
to be true. In this setting the following additional axiom seems desirable:
∀s ∈ ClTermLB∀φ ∈ SentLT
(
s◦ = φ→ TT (s) ≡ Tφ
)
, (TRP)
where "TRP" abbreviates "TRansParency". Obviously if one wants to have a compo-
sitional theory of self-applicable truth, one cannot simply take (TRP) the axioms CT1
through CT6 and let the quantifiers range over all formulae of LT , since the resulting
theory would be inconsistent by Tarski’s Theorem. The next two theories which we shall
investigate exhibit two different directions in which one can look for a natural theory of
untyped truth. In the first one the axiom CT3 is rejected and somewhat compensated. In
the second one the transparency axiom is missing.
Definition 45. KF−[B] is the LT -theory extending B with the following axioms:
KF1 ∀s, t ∈ ClTermLB T (s = t) ≡ s
◦ = t◦.
KF2 ∀s, t ∈ ClTermLB T (s 6= t) ≡ s
◦ 6= t◦.
KF3 ∀s1, . . . , sn ∈ ClTermLB TR(s1, . . . , sn) ≡ R(s1
◦, . . . , sn
◦), for every relational sym-
bol of LB.
KF4 ∀s1, . . . , sn ∈ ClTermLB T¬R(s1, . . . , sn) ≡ ¬R(s1
◦, . . . , sn
◦), for every relational
symbol of LB.
KF5 ∀φ ∈ SentLT T (¬¬φ) ≡ Tφ.
KF6 ∀φ,ψ ∈ SentLT T (φ ∨ ψ) ≡ Tφ ∨ Tψ.
KF7 ∀φ,ψ ∈ SentLT T (¬(φ ∨ ψ)) ≡ T¬φ ∧ T¬ψ.
KF8 ∀y ∈ Var∀φ ∈ Form≤1LT T (∃yφ(y)) ≡ ∃xTφ(x).
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KF9 ∀y ∈ Var∀φ ∈ Form≤1LT T (¬∃yφ(y)) ≡ ∀xT¬φ(x).
KF10 ∀s¯, t¯ ∈ ClTermSeqLB∀φ(x¯) ∈ FormLT
(
s¯◦ = t¯◦ → Tφ(s¯) ≡ Tφ(t¯)
)
.
KF11 ∀φ ∈ SentLT ∀t ∈ TermLB t
◦ = φ→ TT (t) ≡ Tφ.
KF12 ∀φ ∈ SentLT ∀t ∈ TermLB t
◦ = φ→ T¬T (t) ≡ T¬φ.
KF, a theory obtained by augmenting KF−[PA]with full induction scheme for formu-
lae with the truth predicate, was introduced by Feferman in [6] as an axiomatisation of
a theory of truth proposed by Kripke in [14]. KF− represents an attempt to define a rea-
sonably behaved self-applicable truth predicate guided by the following intuition: we try
to mark the sentences which are definitely true. We start with the set of true equations
on arithmetical sets. Then we proceed in stages, e.g. whenever φ and ψ are definitely
true, we mark φ ∧ ψ as definitely true. Whenever φ is definitely true, we mark T (φ) as
definitely true. Whenever ¬φ(x) is definitely true for all x, we mark ¬∃φ(x) as definitely
true. Thus in the process we only enlarge the set of true sentences until it reaches a fixed
point. KF− axiomatises properties of fixed points obtained in such a way.
The desirable feature of KF−[B] is that it satisfies the TRP axiom. However, the idem-
potence of the truth predicate fails rather spectacularily in a different place. It turns out
that adding both derivation rules
φ
T (φ)
(NEC)
T (φ)
φ
(CONEC)
to KF−[B] at the same time yields this theory inconsistent (see [10], Lemma 15.20. The
Lemma is stated for the full KF, but the induction axioms are not used in the proof).
Moreover, the rule (NEC) is inconsistent with the following axiom of consistency which
says that no sentence is both true and false:
∀φ ∈ SentLT ¬ (Tφ ∧ T¬φ) .
Dually, the rule (CONEC) is inconsistent with the axiom of completeness which states
that every sentence is either true or false.
The other standard candidate for a well-behaved theory of self-referential truth is
Friedman–Sheard’s theory FS.
Definition 46. FS−[B] is the extension of B in the language extending T with the follow-
ing axioms:
FS1 ∀s, t ∈ ClTermLB T (s = t) ≡
(
s◦ = t◦
)
.
FS2 ∀s1, . . . , sn ∈ ClTermLB TR(s1, . . . , sn) ≡ R(s1
◦, . . . , sn
◦), for every relational sym-
bol of LB.
FS3 ∀φ ∈ SentLT T (¬φ) ≡ ¬T (φ).
FS4 ∀φ,ψ ∈ SentLT T (φ ∨ ψ) ≡ T (φ) ∨ T (ψ).
FS5 ∀v ∈ Var∀φ ∈ Form≤1LT T (∃vφ) ≡ ∃xTφ(x).
FS6 ∀s¯, t¯ ∈ ClTermSeqLB∀φ(x¯) ∈ FormLT
(
s¯◦ = t¯◦ → Tφ(s¯) ≡ Tφ(t¯)
)
.
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which additionally is closed under the rules (NEC) and (CONEC).
Note that in none of the above theories we extend the induction scheme to the fullLT .
As usual we write simply FS− to abbreviate FS−[PA].
A set of axioms, which is deductively equivalent to the above was first introduced in
[8]. The above list of axioms is taken from [10] with a minor variation: we supplemented
the normal axiomatization with FS6 for reasons analogous to the ones for CT−.
At first sight, FS−[B] seems to be much more natural than KF−[B]. The presence of
NEC and CONEC rules compensates in a way the lack of the transparency axiommaking
the theory symmetric: for every φ ∈ LT it holds that
FS−[B] ⊢ φ ⇐⇒ FS−[B] ⊢ Tφ.
This heavily contrasts with the case of KF−[B]. However this symmetric feature turns out
to be very pricey, as the well-known McGee’s theorem shows:
Theorem 47 (McGee, [16]). FS−[B] is ω-inconsistent.
Moreover, the fully inductive versions of both theories differ dramatically in strength,
when evaluated over PA: KF[PA] can define ε0 levels of the ramified truth hierarchy (i.e.
RT<α for every α < ε0. See [10] for details), while the strength of FS[PA] is exhausted by
ω-many such levels. We sketch the proof of the latter fact in Subsection 3.3.3 and give a
strengthening of it in Subsection 4.3.
Both KF−[B] and FS−[B] are conservative extensions of B.
Theorem 48 (Cantini, [1]). KF−[B] is a conservative extension of B.
The above theorem has been proved by Cantini for PA, but his proof works essentially
in the same way for all base theories B with a modicum of arithmetic. Conservativity of
FS− follows from thework ofHalbach. He showed that FSwith full induction is reducible
to the system RT<ω with full induction and a stratified family of compositional truth
predicates. His proof, however, does not rely on induction in the considered theories or
on the specific choice of the base theory. Therefore, essentially the same argument shows
that FS−[B] is reducible to RT−<ω[B] for a wide choice of base theories B. Conservativity
of RT−<ω[B] can in turn be shown by using known proofs of conservativity for CT
−, so,
in a sense, it was "in the air".10 We will provide more details (including the definition of
RT−<ω) in Subsection 3.3.3.
Theorem 49 (Essentially due to Halbach). FS−[B] is a conservative extension of B.
We shall sketch both proofs in the next Subsection 3.3.
3.3 Conservativity of truth theories
The main goal of this paper is to establish that certain truth theories over PA are feasibly
reducible to PA. This involves certain elaborate technical arguments in each case. How-
ever, what these proofs have in common is that they all rely on the results from Subsection
2.5 since they follow the same general pattern: Suppose that T is a theory of truth overPA
10However, we know of no published proof of this result.
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that is conservative over PA. Moreover, assume that the conservativity proof in fact can
be formalized in PA and that it is uniform in the sense that the proof works equally well
for PA and its large enough finitely axiomatized fragments B that containing I∆0 + Exp.
Then T can be shown to be feasibly reducible to PA. Let us recall the precise formulation
of this fact (it was formulated as Corollary 36):
Suppose that T is a finite extension of PA of the form PA + φ, k ∈ N, and the following sentence
is provable in PA:
"If B is any finite fragment of PA, then every ∆2-full model of B has an elementary extension to
a∆k-model of B + φ."
Then T is feasibly reducible to PA.
The proofs of our feasible reducibility results will in each case consist in an appro-
priate arithmetization in PA of a known conservativity proof of T over fragments of PA.
Therefore, we are forced to pay close attention to the specific features of the arithmetical
implementation of the conservativity proofs, which is bound to obscure the main idea of
the proof of feasible reduction. Therefore, to provide some help to the reader, we present
outlines of the relevant conservativity proofs in this section.
3.3.1 Conservativity of CT−
In this section, we sketch the proof of the following conservativity result:
Theorem 50. Fix any fragment B of PA extending I∆0+Exp. Then CT
−[B] is conservative over
B.
Sketch of a proof. We will base our proof on the argument given by Enayat and Visser in
[5]. Fix any modelM of B. We will construct (M′, T ) |= CT−[B] whereMM′ by first
constructing a chain of models
(M0,∅) ⊆ (M1, S1) ⊆ (M2, S2) ⊆ . . .
such that M0 = M, Mi  Mi+1 and the subsets Si are partially defined satisfaction
predicates. Each Si+1 satisfies compositional conditions for all valuations fromMi+1 but
only for formulae fromMi. This condition is axiomatized as a scheme. For example, we
require for any arithmetical formulae φ,ψ ∈ Mi separately that:
(Mi+1, Si+1) |= ∀α ∈ Asn(φ,ψ) Si+1(φ ∨ ψ,α) ≡ Si+1(φ, α) ∨ Si+1(ψ,α)
and for any formula φ
(Mi+1, Si+1) |= ∀α ∈ Asn(∃vφ) Si+1(∃vφ, α) ≡ ∃α
′ ∼v α Si+1(φ, α
′).
Thus we require that Si+1 behaves compositionally for formulae which belong toMi, in-
cluding nonstandard ones. Additionally, we require that Si+1 agreeswith Si on formulae
fromMi−1 and arbitrary valuations. Note that if φ ∈ Mi, then a direct subformula of φ
also belongs toMi. In other words: the predicate gets fixed on the formulae on which it
is guaranteed to behave compositionally.
We write the compositional conditions for Sn+1 in a pointwise manner (formula by
formula), so in order to check that such an extension exists, by compactness, we only
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have to check that for each finite subset of formulae from Mi, we can find a predicate
Si+1 which satisfies compositional conditions for these formulae. This turns out to be
possible with a fairly straightforward recursion.
Finally, we take the sum of models (Mi, Si). In order to check that the resulting sum
satisfies compositional axioms (for formulae and assignments), we take an arbitrary for-
mula φ, its direct subformulae, and some fixed valuation α forφ. We check that it satisfied
compositional conditions in themodel (Mi+1, Si+1), such that φ andwas present already
inMi, and that the compositional conditions were preserved along the construction.
Finally, we turn the model (M′, S) with a satisfaction class (i.e., a set of pairs (φ, α)
such that φ is an arithmetical formula and α ∈ Asn(φ)) obtained as a sum of a chain into
a model with a truth class. We define T (M ′ as follows
φ ∈ T ≡ φ ∈ SentLPA(M
′) ∧ (φ,∅) ∈ S.
This concludes the sketch of the proof. A detailed argument will be presented in Subsec-
tion 4.1.
The proof as written above does not overtly formalise in PA. The problem is as fol-
lows: when we speak in PA of full models (Mi, Si), we really speak of formulae defining
elementary diagrams of (Mi, Si). The defining formulae for the full models can in gen-
eral be more and more complex as we iterate the construction, and there might be no
formally correct way of defining the sum of the obtained chain of models. Actually, we
cannot even define the whole chain, but only its standard initial fragments.
There are a couple of ways to circumvent this issue. The route undertaken in this pa-
per is the simplest we know of: we do not speak directly of models, but rather, through
appropriate first order theories. More specifically, wewill show that for any natural num-
ber x, the theory Tx (formulated in an extension of the language of B with finitely many
new predicate symbols), saying:
"There exists a chain (M0, S0) ⊆ (M1, S1) ⊆ . . . ⊆ (Mx, Sx) of models satisfying the
conditions from the Enayat–Visser construction."
is consistent. This will be done by formalising the inductive step in the construction by
Enayat and Visser, i.e., by showing that for all numbers x, if Tx is consistent, then Tx+1
is consistent as well. The consistency of Tx is a Π1-statement, so PA will be able to verify
that for any x the theory Tx is consistent. This in turn will be enough to show that the
theory saying:
"There is a chain of models: (M0, S0) ⊆ (M1, S1) ⊆ . . . of infnite length which satisfy
conditions from Enayat–Visser construction."
is consistent, hence has a model. From this model we will be able to define the whole
chain in a uniformway and, consequently, its sum, which will give us a model of CT−[B]
(not a full model though). The details involve a number of intricate and technical consid-
erations; they are presented in the next section.
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3.3.2 Conservativity of KF−
In this subsection we will outline the proof of conservativity of KF−[B], where B is a
fragment of PA extending I∆0 + Exp. The standard proof of conservativity is motivated
by the original construction of Kripke.11 We can define truth predicate semantically as a
fixed point of an operator that takes a subset Tα of N, thought of as the set of sentences
(possibly containing the truth predicate)which can be already identified as true at a given
stage of the construction, and replaces it with Tα+1 ⊇ Tα in the following way:
• If φ is a true atomic or negated atomic formula, then φ ∈ Tα+1.
• If φ ∈ Tα, then φ ∈ Tα+1.
• If φ ∈ Tα, and φ = t
◦ for a term t, then T (t) ∈ Tα+1.
• If ¬φ ∈ Tα, and (¬φ) = t
◦, then ¬T (t) ∈ Tα+1.
• If φ ∈ Tα, then ¬¬φ ∈ Tα+1.
• If φ ∈ Tα or ψ ∈ Tα, then φ ∨ ψ ∈ Tα+1.
• If ¬φ ∈ Tα and ¬ψ ∈ Tα, then ¬(φ ∨ ψ) ∈ Tα+1.
• If φ(x) ∈ Tα, then ∃vφ(v) ∈ Tα+1.
• If ¬φ(x) ∈ Tα for all x, then ¬∃vφ(v) ∈ Tα+1.
If λ is a limit ordinal, we set Tλ =
⋃
α<λ Tα. In the above construction, we enlarge the
set Tα of sentences which are definitely true with a set of sentences which are definitely
true if we interpret the truth predicate as the set Tα. Since at each stage, we only keep
enlarging our set, the construction will reach its fixed point. Such fixed points can be
easily shown to satisfy the axioms of KF−[B]. The outlined argument carries over to an
arbitrary modelM of B thus establishing conservativity of KF−[B] over its base theory.
The main problem with the outlined argument is that it does not directly formalize
in PA since it relies on the principle: "Every positive operator on subsets of N reaches a
fixpoint." which is clearly not available in PA. However, there is a rather simple fix to this
problem.
Start with a recursively saturated model M |= B. Notice that for n ∈ ω, the n-th set
obtained in the inductive procedure described above, Tn, is arithmetically definable in
M (let us call the defining formula Θn). By definability of Tn and recursive saturation
of M, we can deduce that already Tω is a truth predicate satisfying axioms of KF
−[B].
Essentially, this relies on the fact that in recursively saturatedmodels φ(x) ∈ Tω holds for
all x ∈M if and only if φ(x) ∈ Tk holds for some k ∈ ω and all x ∈M .
12
It turns out that this argument can be repeated in PA for a finitely axiomatized frag-
ment B of PA extending I∆0 + Exp. Namely, we first take a full modelM of B, then we
take its recursively saturated elementary extension, a full modelM′ and we define the
predicateT inM′ as the sumof all sets definedwith certain formulaeΘc defining the ana-
logues of the sets Tc from the above construction. The details will be given in Subsection
4.2
11What we present here more resembles a modified constructions which seems to be first formulated by
Cantini in [1].
12A very similar argument has been presented in [3] in the proof that any recursively saturated model
of PA can be expanded to a model of PT− with internal induction for total formulae. It seems that this
reasoning appears originally in [1], where Cantini proved conservativity of KF− with internal induction for
total formulae over PA.
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3.3.3 Conservativity of FS−
The proof of conservativity of FS− over PA is analogous to the one showing the upper
bounds on the proof-theoretical strength of its fully inductive version, FS[PA]. As an
intermediate step we pass through a theory of iterated compositional truth predicate of
length ω, RT−<ω .
Definition 51. RT−<n+1[B] is the extension ofB in the languageL<n+1 extendingLPA with
n+ 1 new predicate symbols {T0, . . . , Tn} (we stipulate that L<0 = LPA and RT
−
<0 = PA)
satisfying the following axioms for all k < n+ 1:
RT1 ∀s, t ∈ ClTermLPA Tk(s = t) ≡ s
◦ = t◦.
RT2 ∀φ ∈ SentL<k Tk(¬φ) ≡ ¬Tk(φ).
RT3 ∀φ,ψ ∈ SentL<k Tk(φ ∨ ψ) ≡ Tk(φ) ∨ Tk(ψ).
RT4 ∀φ(x) ∈ Form≤1L<k∀v ∈ Var Tk(∃vφ) ≡ ∃x Tk(φ(x)).
RT5 ∀s¯, t¯ ∈ ClTermSeqLPA∀φ(x) ∈ Form
≤1
L<k
(
s¯◦ = t¯◦ → Tk(φ(s¯)) ≡ Tk(φ(t¯))
)
.
RT6
∧
i<k ∀s ∈ ClTermLPA
(
s◦ ∈ SentL<i → Tk(Ti(s)) ≡ Ti(s
◦)
)
.
RT7 ∀i < k∀s ∈ ClTermLPA
(
s◦ ∈ SentL<i → Tk(Ti(s)) ≡ Tk(s
◦)
)
Define RT−<ω[PA] :=
⋃
n∈ω RT
−
<n[PA]
Remark 52. We assume that the initially chosen coding is extended in such away that the
length of Tn is logarithmic in n (in fact, polynomial will do, so this logarythmic bound is
not that important).
As in the case of FS−, RT−<n and RT
−
<ω abbreviate RT
−
<n[PA] and RT
−
<ω[PA] respec-
tively. Note that similarly to all the rest of theories studied in this paper, in RT−<ω we do
not extend the scheme of induction to formulae with the truth predicate.
Now let B be our base theory. We shall now reduce the problem of conservativity of
FS−[B] over B to the analogous problem for RT−<ω . Let us recall that an interpretation
∗
is an ω-interpretation, if for every arithmetical sentence φ we have
φ∗ = φ.
In order to perform the above mentioned reduction it suffices to show that every "finite
piece" of FS− can be ω-interpreted in RT−<ω. In this context "an n-piece" means "a sen-
tence which can be deduced from B and axioms FS1–FS6 (note that in this context FS2
is missing) using at most n applications of NEC and CONEC rules." We shall denote it
with FS−n [B]. Thus φ is in FS
−
1 [B] if it can be deduced using one application of the NEC
rule or one application of the CONEC rule. (But not both. Our definition differs from the
original one given by Halbach.) Now the following holds:
Lemma 53 (Essentially Halbach, [10], Theorem 14.31). For each n, FS−n [B] is ω-interpretable
in RT−<2n+1[B].
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Proof. Define a family {gn}n∈N of primitive recursive functions as follows
gn(k) =


k if k = (s = t),
p0 = 1q if k /∈ SentLT or k = T (t) and n = 0,
Tn−1(gn−1(t)) if k = T t and n > 0,
¬gn(φ) if k = ¬φ,
gn(φ) ∨ gn(ψ) if k = φ ∨ ψ,
∃xgn(φ) if k = ∃xφ.
Where Tn(gn(t)) abbreviates
∀x
(
gn(t) = x→ T (x)
)
,
and gn(x) = y is a natural ∆0-formula which represents gn in I∆0 + Exp. We shall check
that for every n, gn+1 is an ω-interpretation of FS
−
n [B] in RT
−
<2n+1[B]. It is evident that
each gn acts as identity on arithmetical sentences. Moreover, for every φ ∈ LT and each
n, gn(φ) is a sentence of L<n (that is, it contains truth predicates with indices at most
n − 1) and this fact is provable in B. Hence if φ is any axiom from FS1 through FS6 and
0 < k ≤ n, then
RT−<n[B] ⊢ gk(φ). (∗)
Now, following the lines of Halbach’s argument, we fix n and, by induction on i up to n,
we show that for every i ≤ n and every j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , 2n+ 1− i}13 we have:
∀ψ FS−i [B] ⊢ ψ =⇒ RT
−
<2n+1[B] ⊢ gj(ψ).
Note that (∗) witnesses that the above holds for i = 0. Now inductively assume that
the above holds for an 0 < i < n and fix j ∈ {i+ 2, . . . , 2n+ 1− (i+ 1)}.
Fix a proof π of ψ in FS−i+1[B]. Arguing by induction assume that the last rule used in
π is either NEC or CONEC. In both cases we will use the fact that for all k ≤ l < m, and
every φ ∈ L<k, RT
−
<m[B] proves
Tl(φ) ≡ φ. (∗∗)
If ψ is obtained by NEC, then ψ = T (θ) and by our induction assumption we know
that RT−<2n+1[B] ⊢ gj−1(θ). Since gj−1(θ) ∈ Sent<j−1, by (∗∗) we obtain RT
−
<2n+1[B] ⊢
Tj−1(gj−1(θ)). The last sentence is by definition equal to gj(T (θ)), hence this case is done.
If ψ is obtained by CONEC, then we argue dually using gj+1 applied to T (ψ).
In the rest of this sectionwe sketch the proof of conservativity ofRT−<ω[B] overB based
on Enayat-Visser construction. For starters, let us note that it suffices to construct, for an
arbitrary modelM |= B a chain of models (Mi)i∈ω such that
1. M0 =M;
2. Mi |= RT
−
<i;
3. Mi L<i Mi+1.
Then
⋃
i∈NMi will be an elementary extension ofM satisfying RT
−
<ω[B]. To getMi+1 we
basically start the Enayat-Visser construction (as sketched in Subsection 3.3.1) onMi for
the base language L<i. More precisely, we build an ω-chain of models (M
j
i , Sj)j∈N such
that
13That this range of j shrinks in the induction process is needed to deal with CONEC.
28
1. M0i =Mi and S0 = ∅;
2. Mji L<i M
j+1
i ;
3. Sj ⊆ Sj+1
4. Sj+1 is a satisfaction class forFormL<i(M
j
i )with respect to all valuations fromM
j+1
i
Satisfying the above requirements would suffice to guarantee that in the limit model ax-
ioms RT1 through RT6 will hold. However, to account for RT7 we have to improve our
satisfaction classes Sj slightly. This can be done by requiring that Sj+1 makes true all the
statements φ such that
Mji |= Tl(φ),
for l ≤ i and φ ∈ Sent
M
j
i
L<l
(i.e., 〈φ, α〉 ∈ Sj+1 for such any φ and for every assignment
α ∈ Mj+1i ). This, in turn, requires only a tiny modification of the original Enayat–Visser
proof. Details will be presented in Section 4.3.
4 The main act: feasible reductions of truth theories
This section contains the principal results of this paper. The first three subsections are
devoted, respectively, to feasible reductions of CT−[PA], KF−[PA], and FS−[PA] to PA. The
last section, on the other hand, presents an interpretability-theoretic perspective of our
work.
4.1 Feasible reduction of CT−[PA] to PA
This section is devoted to the proof of the following result:
Theorem 54. CT−[PA] is feasibly reducible to PA.
An immediate corollary of Theorem54 is thatCT−[PA]doesnot have super-polynomial
speed-up over PA. The proof of a special case of this corollary for Π1-sentences of arith-
meticwas presentedby Fischer [7], based onan outline suggestedbyVisser, but as pointed
out in a footnote in Subsection 2.6 the presented proof lacks an important detail.
Our proof of Theorem 54 will be based on the verification of the veracity of the as-
sumption of Corollary 36 for k = 4 and T = CT−[PA]. In fact, we shall do slightly better:
let us say that a theory B is good if it is formulated in a language LB that extendsLPA with
new finitely many relation symbols (so all terms are arithmetical) and B extends IΣ1. We
shall show that for every l ∈ N the following single sentence is provable in PA:
"If B is any∆1-good theory, then every ∆l-full model of B has an elementary extension
to a∆l+2-model of CT
−[B]."
In the above, l is to be thought as independent of the size of the proof that our reduction
takes as an argument. In the case of CT−[PA] we will need the above theorem only for
l = 2. The more uniform version will be needed to handle the FS−[PA] case.
Our proof consists in formalizing the ω-chain Enayat–Visser construction inside PA,
according to the sketch given in Subsection 3.3. As in the conservativity proof of Enayat
and Visser, we shall make a detour through partial satisfaction classes. Let us introduce
one more definition that will play an intermediate role in the proof below.
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Convention 55. If P is an arbitrary unary predicate and φ(x) an arbitrary formula with
one free variable, then we write φ ↾P for the formula φ(x) ∧ P (x).
Definition 56 (CS− ↾P ). Let B be a theory in a finite language LB extending IΣ1 and P
be a fresh unary predicate. CS− ↾P [B] is the theory of P -restricted, extensional satisfaction
class for LB formulated in the language LS = LB ∪ {S} ∪ {P} and extending B with the
following axioms:
1. ∀x, y
(
S(x, y)→ x ∈ FormLB ↾P ∧y ∈ Asn(x)
)
.
2. ∀s0 . . . ∀sn ∈ TermLB ↾P ∀α ∈ Asn(s0, . . . , sn)
(
S(R(s0, . . . , sn), α) ≡ R(s
α
0 , . . . , s
α
n)
)
.
3. ∀φ,ψ ∈ FormLB ↾P ∀α ∈ Asn(φ,ψ)
(
S(φ ∨ ψ,α) ≡ S(φ, α) ∨ S(ψ,α)
)
.
4. ∀φ ∈ FormLB ↾P ∀α ∈ Asn(φ)
(
S(¬φ, α) ≡ ¬S(φ, α)
)
.
5. ∀φ ∈ FormLB ↾P ∀v ∈ Var ↾P ∀α ∈ Asn(∃vφ)
(
S(∃vφ, α) ≡ ∃ β ∼v α, β ∈
Asn(φ) S(φ, β)
)
.
and the axiom of generalized regularity:
∀φ ∈ FormB ↾P ∀v¯ ∈ FVSeq(φ) ↾P ∀s¯, t¯ ∈ ClTermSeqLB ↾P ∀α ∈ Asn(φ[s¯/v¯], φ[t¯/v¯])
(s¯α = t¯α → (S(φ[s¯/v¯], α) ≡ S(φ[t¯/v¯], α)))
IfM |= B and P ⊆ M , S ⊆ M2 is such that (M, S, P ) |= CS− ↾P [B], then S is called
a P -restricted extensional satisfaction class for LB onM. If S is "x = x"-restricted, it is called
full. Note that the above notion makes sense even if (M, S, P ) is not a full model since
CS− ↾P [B] is a finite extension of B (recall Definition 29).
Note that in the definition above we do not restrict the range of assignments (denoted
by variable α in the above definition). In effect, we do not assume that the assignments
come from the restricted set. This is crucial to our purposes.
Convention 57. Below we always assume that P is either empty or defines inM a uni-
verse of an elementary submodel ofM. This certainly can be sustained along the induc-
tive condition from the proof below. Under this assumption, P is closed under the direct
subformula relation, which we denote with ⊳. More precisely
(M, P ) |= ∀φ,ψ ∈ FormLB
((
P (φ) ∧ ψ ⊳ φ
)
→ P (ψ)
)
.
The distinctive feature of Enayat-Visser technique of building truth classes is that one
creates a well-behaved satisfaction class via a union of chain argument. Let us now state
the proposition which will provide us with a proof of the induction step in this construc-
tion.
Lemma 58 (Arithmetized Enayat-Visser construction). LetLB be a finite language extending
LPA. The sentence expressing the following implication is provable in PA for every l ∈ N:
If (M, S, P ) is a∆l-full model for LB such that:
1. M |= IΣ1;
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2. S is a P -restricted satisfaction class for LB;
then there exists a∆l+1-full model N for LB and an ∆l+1-set S
′ ⊆ N2 such that:
1. M N ;
2. S′ is anM -restricted satisfaction class for LB (we add a predicate for the universe ofM to
the language);
3. S ⊆ S′.
Remark 59. We call the reader’s attention to the asymetry in the above lemma: we start
with a full model (M, S, P ) but finishwith a full modelN and two its subsetsS′,M . This
will be compensated for in our inductive construction.
Proof. We work in PA. Let (M, S, P ) be as in the antecedent of the implication. We fol-
low the lines of the standard Enayat-Visser proof from [5], but we perform it inside PA.
Moreover we have the additional technical complication caused by adding the regularity
axiom to CT−[B]. Let us define the language LEV:
LEV = LB ∪ {P} ∪ {S} ∪ {c | c ∈M} ∪ {Uφ(x) | M |= φ ∈ FormLB} .
Now let us define the Enayat-Visser theory for (M, P, S) as the sum of the following sets:
{φ(a1, . . . , an) | φ ∈ LB, ai ∈M,M |= φ(a1, . . . , an)} (= ElDiag(M)),
{Uφ(α) | 〈φ, α〉 ∈ S, φ ∈ P} ,{
∀α ∈ Asn(s0, . . . , sn),
(
UR(s0,...,sn)(α) ≡ R(s
α
0 , . . . , s
α
n)
)
| R ∈ LB, s0, . . . , sn ∈ TermLB(M)
}
,{
∀α ∈ Asn(ψ)
(
Uψ(α) ≡ Uφ(α) ∨ Uθ(α)
)
| M |= ψ ∈ SentLB ∧ (ψ = (φ ∨ θ))
}
,{
∀α ∈ Asn(ψ)
(
Uψ(α) ≡ ¬Uφ(α)
)
| M |= ψ ∈ SentLB ∧ ψ = (¬φ)
}
,{
∀α ∈ Asn(ψ)
(
Uψ(α) ≡ ∃β ∼v α Uφ(β)
)
| M |= ψ ∈ SentLB ∧ ψ = (∃vφ)
}
,{
∀α, β ∈ Asn(ψ, s, t),
(
s¯α = t¯β → (Uψ(α) ≡ Uφ(β))
)
|
M |= s¯, t¯ ∈ TermSeqLB ∧ ∃θ ∈ FormLB ∃v¯ ∈ FVSeq(θ) (ψ = θ[s¯/v¯] ∧ φ = θ[t¯/v¯])
}
.
We argue that this theory is consistent. Then, by ACT (Theorem 9) there will be a∆l+1-
modelN of this theory. Then putting:
S′ = {〈x, y〉 | x ∈ FormLB(M) ∧N |= Ux(y)} ,
we easily check that the triple (N , S′,M) satisfies the claim.
To prove the consistency, we will argue by the compactness theorem. Let F be a finite
(in the sense of PA) fragment of this theory. For each predicate Uφ which occurs in F we
will find a formula θφ(x) ∈ LB such that
(M, P, S) |= F [θφ/Uφ]Uφ∈F ,
where F [θφ/Uφ]Uφ∈F denotes the theory resulting from F by replacing each occurrence
Uφ with the corresponding formula θφ. Note that the above makes perfect sense, since
(M, S, P ) is a full model. This clearly guarantees thatF is consistent. Moreover fromnow
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on we do not need to bother with the sentences from ElDiag(M), since they obviously
hold inM.
As in the original Enayat-Visser proof we construe θφ’s by induction on the appro-
priately defined rank. Note that we have more work to do here than in the proofs given
by Enayat and Visser [5] (since in their set-up, the language of arithmetic is purely rela-
tional), and by Cieśliński [2] (since in his set-up CT− does not include our generalized
regularity axiom CT6). Let c be the set of formulae φ such that the predicate Uφ occurs in
a formula in F . Let b be an arbitrary coded set of formulae of LB. We put rank
b(φ) ≥ x
iff there exists a sequence y such that the following three conditions hold (in the last con-
dition ⊳ denotes the relation of being an immediate subformula):
1. len(y) = x+ 1 and (y)x = {φ}.
2. For all i < x+ 1 (y)i ⊆ b.
3. For all i < x for all θ, θ ∈ (y)i+1 iff for all ψ such thatM |= ψ ⊳ θ, ψ ∈ (y)i.
We say that rankb(φ) = x if x is the greatest x such that rankb(φ) ≥ x. This definition
makes sense, since if rankb(φ) ≥ x, then x ≤ |b| where |c| denotes the cardinality of c.
Example 60. If b = {0 = 0, 0 = 0 ∨ 1 = 1}, then the rankb(0 = 0 ∨ 1 = 1) = 0, since
1 = 1 /∈ b.
The intuition behind the above definition is that rankc(φ) is the complexity of φwhere
formulae whose some immediate subformula does not belong to c are treated as atoms.
The idea is that for any such formula the satisfaction set Uφ can be defined almost arbi-
trarily and then Uψ’s for formulae of higher rank can be defined in terms of previously
defined satisfaction sets.
Observe that if we follow the above described recursive procedure, then all the com-
positional axioms (i.e., counterparts of axioms for atomic formulae, disjunction, negation
and quantifier) from F will be satisfied. However, we have one immediate problem: it
can happen that (an instance of) the axiom of regularity for φ and ψ is in F , but φ and ψ
get different ranks. In such a situation the standard procedure does not seem to guaran-
tee that θφ and θψ (i.e. formulae which interpret Uφ and Uψ in (M, S, P )) will satisfy the
regularity axiom. To simplify the notation let us define φ ≈F ψ if the following is in F :
∀α ∈ Asn(ψ, s¯)∀β ∈ Asn(φ, t¯)
(
s¯α = t¯β → (Uψ(α) ≡ Uφ(β))
)
.
Note that it can happen only if the following holds inM (this follows by definition of the
Enayat–Visser theory):
s¯, t¯ ∈ TermSeqLB ∧ ∃θ ∈ FormLB ∃v¯ ∈ FVSeq(θ) (ψ = θ[s¯/v¯] ∧ φ = θ[t¯/v¯]) .
A solution to our puzzle is to complete c, obtaining ĉ, to assure that we have for all φ, ψ
φ ≈F ψ ⇒ rank
ĉ(φ) = rankĉ(ψ).
It is convenient to extend ≈F a little bit to make it an equivalence relation. We say that ξ
is the term trivialization of φ, and write ξ = φ̂ if the following four conditions hold:
1. For every occurrence t of a term in ξ, if all occurrences of variables in t are free, then
t is a free occurrence of a variable.
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2. No variable occurs in ξ as both bounded and free, and no variable occurs as free
more than once.
3. For some ρ, a function with domain FV(θ) and values in TermLB , the equality ξ[ρ] =
φ holds. (Recall that ξ[ρ] denotes the result of a formal substitution of terms for free
variables of ξ and that TermLB contains also terms with free variables.)
4. The indices of free variables of ξ are chosen in a canonical way (for example accord-
ing to the tree-ordering of the syntactical tree of ξ. This is only needed to guarantee
uniqueness).
The idea behind φ̂ is that if for some term substitution ρ and some formula ψ we have
φ[ρ] = ψ,
then, φ̂ = ψ̂ and there are unique term substitutions γ1, γ2 such that:
φ̂[γ1] = φ and φ̂[γ2] = ψ.
We write φ ≈M ψ ifM |= φ̂ = ψ̂.14 Obviously ≈M is an equivalence relation. More-
over,≈M is a congruence with respect to the direct subformula relation ⊳, i.e. the follow-
ing lemma holds. For its proof consult the appendix.
Lemma 61 (Congruence lemma). For all φ, φ′, ψ′ it holds that(
φ ⊳ φ′ ∧ φ′ ≈M ψ′
)
⇒ ∃ψ
(
ψ ⊳ ψ′ ∧ ψ ≈M φ
)
. (C)
By induction it follows that the congruence lemma holds for ⊳a in place of ⊳, where
⊳a denotes the a-step transitive closure of ⊳ (by stipulation ⊳0 is the relation of equality).
Finally, observe that for every φ, U
φ̂
and Uφ are mutually interdefinable. Indeed, fix
φ and γ : FV(φ̂) → TermLB such that φ̂[γ] = φ. Then, having Uφ̂, we define Uφ with the
condition:
α ∈ Uφ ⇐⇒ ∃β ∈ Uφ̂∀v ∈ FV(φ̂) β(v) = γ(v)
α. (U
φ̂
→ Uφ)
Similarly, having Uφ we define Uφ̂ with the condition:
β ∈ U
φ̂
⇐⇒ ∃α ∈ Uφ∀v ∈ FV(φ̂) β(v) = γ(v)
α. (Uφ → Uφ̂)
Now, define ĉ to be the completion of c if for all ψ, ψ ∈ ĉ if and only if there exists i, j ≤ m
and ψ′, φ, φ′ ∈ c such that the following pair of conditions hold:
1. M |= ψ ⊳i ψ
′ ∧ φ ⊳j φ
′
2. φ ≈M ψ.
ψ′ φ′
ψ
⊳i
OO
// φ
≈M
oo
⊳j
OO
14The idea of using such term trivializations was directly inspired by Graham Leigh’s [15].
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Let us observe that with the current definition of ĉ it holds that for all φ,ψ ∈ c
φ ≈M ψ ⇒ rankĉ(φ) = rankĉ(ψ).
Indeed, suppose this is not the case. Then, assumming without loss of generality that
rankĉ(φ) > i = rankĉ(ψ)
there exists φ′ ∈ ĉ such that φ′⊳i+1φ but no formula from ĉ is the i+1-st direct subformula
of ψ. By the congruence lemma (and induction) there exists ψ′ such that ψ′ ⊳i+1 ψ and
ψ′ ≈M φ′. Since φ′ ∈ ĉ, then there are θ, θ′, φ′′ ∈ c such that for some j, k ≤ m θ ⊳j θ
′ and
φ′ ⊳k φ
′′ and φ′ ≈M θ (possibly φ′′ = φ = θ′ and θ = φ′—when φ′ ∈ c). Since ≈M is an
equivalence relation, then ψ′ ≈M θ. Now, by the definition of ĉ we obtain that ψ′ ∈ ĉ, a
contradiction.
For every x, let F ↾x denote the fragment of F consisting of axioms for Uφ predicates
forφ of rankĉ atmostx and recall that if {θφ} is a family of formulaewith one free variable
indexed with φ such that Uφ ∈ F ↾x, then
F ↾x [θφ/Uφ]Uφ∈F ↾x
denotes the theory resulting from F ↾x by replacing every occurrence of Uφ with the
formula θφ. Let ζ(x) be the formula asserting the following implication:
"There exists the unique family of LB ∪ {S}-formulae {θφ} rankĉ(φ)≤x indexed with
formulae of rankĉ ≤ x such that:
1. For every φ, if rankĉ(φ) = 0, then:
(a) ifM |= ∃t1, . . . , ta ∈ TermLBφ = R(t0, . . . , ta), then θφ(x) = R(t
x
0 , . . . , t
x
a), and
(b) if φ is from P , then θφ(x) = S(φ, x), and
(c) if for some ψ ∈ P , φ ≈M ψ, then Uφ is defined from Uψ using (Uφ̂ → Uφ) and
(Uφ → Uφ̂);
(d) otherwise put θφ(x) = (x 6= x).
2. (M, S, P ) |= F ↾x [θφ/Uφ] rankĉ(φ)≤x."
Now, we prove ∀xζ(x) by induction. This concludes the proof of Lemma 58.
Let us now complete the proof of Theorem 54. We shall show how, working inside
PA, given an arbitrary good∆1-theory B, we can elementarily extend an arbitrary∆l-full
model of B to a ∆l+2-model of CT
−[B]. To this end, working in PA, fix a good theory
B, l ∈ N and a ∆l-full model M of B. Next, still working in PA we shall construct an
unbounded∆l+1-chain of∆l+1-full models
(M0, S0), (M1, S1,M0), . . . , (Mx, Sx,Mx−1), . . .
such that:
R1 MM0,
and for each y we have:
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R2 My My+1,
R3 S0 = ∅ and Sy+1 is anMy-restricted satisfaction class for LB and
R4 Sy ⊆ Sy+1.
In particular each triple (Mx, Sx,Mx−1)will have a fixed∆l+1-complexity. Let us as-
sume that such a chain has been constructed andMx(y) and Sx(y) are formulae defining
the sequences of respective LB-full models and restricted satisfaction classes. For exam-
ple it holds thatMx(y) iff y is the definition of the x-th full model (recall that officially
full models are identified with their elementary diagrams). Then (in PA) we define the
limit model with the formulae:
M∞(z) := ∃x∃y ∈ Form
1
LPA
(Mx(y) ∧ Satl+1(y, z)) ,
S∞(z) := ∃x∃y ∈ Form
1
LPA
(Sx(y) ∧ Satl+1(y, z)) ,
where Satl+1(x, y) denotes the canonical satisfaction predicate for Σl+1-formulae.
15 Note
that M∞ is really a full LB-model, since the chain is elementary with respect to LB-
formulae and eachMx is a full model for LB.
The rest of the argument follows along the lines of Enayat–Visser proof: we check that
S∞ is a full satisfaction class onM∞, hence (M∞, S∞) is a∆l+2-model of CT
−.
Let us now construct the promised chain of models: reasoning in PA, we first define
a sequence of increasing theories 〈Tm : m ∈ N〉 . Intuitively speaking, for each m, Tm de-
scribes a structure Km = 〈(Mi, Si) : i ≤ m〉 and the family {(Mi, Si,Mi−1)}i≤m satisfies
conditions R1 –R4 for boundedly many numbers. In other words, {(Mi, Si,Mi−1)}i≤m is
the initial segment of our desired chain consisting of firstm+ 1models.
We now give a precise description of Tm. The non-logical symbols of Tm consist of
LB, together with constant symbols for every element of M , unary predicate symbols
{Mi : i ≤ m}, and binary predicate symbols {Si : i ≤ m}. Let Lm denote this language.
Convention 62. If φ is any formula (in the sense of PA), and M(x) is any of Mi’s then we
writeφM to denote the relativisation ofφ toM. Thismeans thatwe syntactically replace all
quantifiers ∃xα(x) with ∃x (M(x) ∧ α(x)), all quantifiers ∀xα(x) with ∀x (M(x)→ α(x))
and adding to φ a conjunct
∧
xi∈FV(φ)
M(xi).
The official translations of R1 through R4 above are as follows:
• Condition R1 is translated as
{
φM0 | φ ∈ ElDiag(M)
}
.
• Condition R2 is translated as{
∀x0 . . . ∀xa
(
φ(x0, . . . , xa)
Mi → φ(x0, . . . , xa)
Mi+1
)
| i < m,φ(x0 . . . , xa) ∈ FormLB
}
.
• Condition R4 is expressed by the following finite set of sentences:
{∀x∀α((Si(x, α)→ Si+1(x, α)) : i < m} .
15Recall that by Convention 28, Satl+1(y, z)means Satl+1(y, ζ), where ζ is a valuation which assigns z to
the only variable of y.
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• Condition R3 is expressed by the conjunction of the universal closures of the fol-
lowing finitelymany axioms 1i-6i, 0 ≤ i ≤ m, which directly correspond to the ones
from Definition 56 (we stipulate that φM−1(x) is always the formula x 6= x) :
1i Si(x, y)→
(
Form
Mi−1
LB
(x) ∧ AsnMi(x, y)
)
.
2i
(
TermSeq
Mi−1
LB
(s¯) ∧ (x = R(s¯))Mi−1 ∧ AsnMi(x, α)
)
→
(
Si(x, α) ≡ (R(s¯
α))Mi
)
.
3i
(
Form
Mi−1
LB
(x) ∧ (x = ¬y)Mi−1 ∧ AsnMi(x, α)
)
→ (Si(x, α) ≡ ¬Si(y, α)) .
4i
(
Form
Mi−1
LB
(x) ∧ (x = y1 ∨ y2)
Mi−1 ∧ AsnMi(x, α)
)
→
Si(x, α) ≡
(
Si (y1, α) ∨ Si (y2, α)
)
.
5i
(
Form
Mi−1
LB
(x) ∧
(
∃v (Var(v) ∧ x = ∃v y)
)Mi ∧ AsnMi(x, α))→
Si(x, α) ≡ ∃α
′
(
(α′ ∼v α)
Mi ∧ Si(y, α
′)
)
.
6i
(
Form
Mi−1
LB
(x) ∧ VarSeqMi−1(v¯) ∧ TermSeq
Mi−1
LB
(s¯) ∧ TermSeq
Mi−1
LB
(t¯) ∧ AsnMi(x, s¯, t¯, α)
)
→((
(y1 = x[s¯/v¯])
Mi ∧ (y2 = x[t¯/v¯])
Mi ∧ (s¯α = t¯α)Mi
)
→
(
Si(y1, α) ≡ Si(y2, α)
))
.
We can now use induction onm to show that ∀m Con(Tm):
Base case Recall that M is a fixed ∆l-full model of B. Let S0 = ∅. Then since S0 is
definable inM, the elementary diagram of K0 := (M, S0) is also definable. This makes
it clear that Con(T0) holds.
Inductive step Fix m and suppose that Con(Tm) holds. Then by Theorem 9, there is a
full modelKm of Tm satisfying R1 through R4 above whose elementary diagram is∆1+l-
definable.
LetLTm be the language of Tm, and letK
−
m be the reduct of the structureKm to the lan-
guage {Mm, Sm,Mm−1,+, ·} in which the universe of discourse is the Km-interpretation
ofMm. For example, sinceLT1 = {M1,M0,+, ·, S0, S1}, amodelK1 of T1will be a structure
of the form (K1,M1,M0,⊕,⊙, S0, S1), whereMi = M
K
i , Si = S
K
i , and K1 is the domain
of discourse of K1. In this case, K
−
1 = (M1,⊕,⊙, S1). So in general K
−
m is of the form
(Mm,⊕,⊙, Sm).16 Observe that K−m is a full model. Typically, its domain is smaller than
the domain of Km.
Also let Mm be the reduct of K
−
m to LB. Let us observe that taking reducts does
not raise the complexity of (the definition of) models, so K−m andMm are still ∆l+1-full
models. To this model apply Lemma 58 for M = Mm, S = Sm and P = Mm−1. We
are given N , a∆l+2-full model for LB, and a∆l+2-set S
′ such that S′ is anMm-restricted
satisfaction class andMm  N . Now we "glue" this model to the end of the chain given
by Km. More precisely, we define a model Km+1 for Lm+1 in the following way. The
16Recall the conventions from Subsection 2.2. Although officially full models are elementary diagrams,
we refer to them as though they were usual structures, as it is routine to translate statements about complete
Henkinized theories into statements about structures.
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universe of Km+1 is the sum of the universes of Km and N (without loss of generality,
renaming the elements of N \Mm if necessary, we assume that Km ∩ N = Mm). Mm+1
is interpreted as N , Sm+1 as S
′ and + and · are interpreted on elements from N as they
were in N . For 0 ≤ i ≤ mMi and Si are interpreted as in Km. Thus we have obtained a
structure which contains an elementary chain of models of B, with N being the top one
and possibly some extra elements in the domain ofKm \N .
Also note that for a structure defined in this manner we do not have an elementary
diagram at our disposal, hence an argument is needed to show that Con(Tm+1) holds. We
argue as in the proof of Corollary 35. Note that if π is an alleged proof of contradiction
from the axioms of Tm+1 which has a subformula property, then only the following types
of sentences can occur in it:
A formulae of the form φM0 for φ ∈ LB;
B subformulae of sentences of the form
∀x0 . . . ∀xa
(
φ(x0, . . . , xa)
Mi → φ(x0, . . . , xa)
Mi+1
)
,
for φ(x0, . . . , x1) ∈ FormLB , i < m+ 1.
C subformulae of sentences from (formalization) of condition R4;
D subformulae of sentences from 1i - 6i, i≤ m+ 1.
The complexity of formulae from C and D is bounded by a standard number. This is not
the case of formulae from A or B. However, to decide every such sentence we can use
ElDiag(Km) and ElDiag(N ) and this is clearly sufficient (all formulae from B are in the
universal closure of boolean closure of formulae of type φMi for i ≤ m+1). All in all, we
can define a Σn-truth predicate for Km+1, for sufficiently large n, which would work for
all formulae from the proof π. It follows that π cannot be a proof of contradiction. This
ends the inductive step and we can conclude that ∀m Con(Tm) holds.
We shall now define the promised chain of models as a full model of the limit of Tm’s.
Define:
T∞ :=
⋃
{Tc | c ∈ N} .
Here N is treated internally, it simply denotes the universe. T∞ is a consistent theory of
complexity∆l (it is computable inElDiag(M)). It follows that it has a∆l+1-fullmodelK∞.
This model gives rise to the ∆l+1-chain of ∆l+1-full models (Mx,Mx−1, Sx)x∈N, which
can be defined as follows:
Mx(y) := K∞ |= Mx(y),
Mx |= φ := K∞ |= φ
Mx ,
Sx(y, z) := K∞ |= Sx(y, z).
The construction guarantees that under such a definition, the chain (Mx, Sx,Mx−1) sat-
isfies the requirements R1 through R4. This finally concludes the proof of feasible reduc-
tion of CT−[PA] to PA.
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4.2 Feasible reduction of KF−[PA] to PA
In this subsection we will establish:
Theorem 63. KF−[PA] is feasibly reducible to PA.
Our proof of the above theoremwill demonstrate that the assumption of Corollary 36
holds with the choice of T = KF−[PA] and k = 4, i.e., we will prove:
Lemma 64. PA proves that for any finite fragment P of PA, every full ∆2-model of B has an
elementary extension to a∆4-model of KF
−[B].
Before proving Lemma 64, we will first show that PA can formalize the proof of the
existence of recursively saturated models.
Lemma 65. For any k ∈ N, PA proves that any ∆k-full modelM of a finite fragment B of PA,
there exists a∆k+1-full modelM
′ such that PA proves:
"M′ is a recursively saturated model of B." (*)
Let us first make sense of the above claim. Recall that by a full model M over a lan-
guage L, we mean an elementary diagram of that model, that is, a complete consistent
Henkinized theory.
We say that a model is recursively saturated if for every Turing machine with code e,
and every finite sequence of elements ofM, a1, . . . , ab ∈ M , if for every finite sequence
φ1(x, y¯), . . . , φc(x, y¯) of formulaewhoseGödel numbers are accepted by themachinewith
index e, there exists an a ∈M such that
M |=
∧
i≤c
φi(a, a1, . . . , ab),
then there exists d ∈M such that for every φ ∈ Lwhich is accepted by the machine with
the code e,
M |= φ(d, a1, . . . , ab).
The above definition is well-known. We cite it here to ensure the reader that it really
can be spelled out in PA and that the claim of recursive saturation ofM can be effectively
produced in polynomial time given the definition ofM.
Let us note that the lemma itself is also well known. Its formulation and proof can be
found in [19], Lemma IX.4.2. We demonstrate it here for the convenience of the reader.
Proof of Lemma 65. We reason in PA. Let L∗
PA
be the arithmetical language with constants
ci,j, i, j ∈ N added. Let (φ
∗
i ) be any polynomial time enumeration of all sentences of
the language L∗
PA
. LetM |= B be a full model and let ElDiag(M)∗ be the theory whose
axioms are elementary diagram of M (which, according to our official definition from
Subsection 2.2 is the modelM itself), all Henkin sentences (in the language with the new
constants), and all sentences of the following shape:∧
i≤N
((
∃xφ∗1(x, y¯) ∧ . . . ∧ φ
∗
k(x, y¯)
)
→ φ∗1(ci,e, y¯) ∧ . . . ∧ φ
∗
k(ci,e, y¯)
)
,
whereN ∈ N, and all the constants of L∗
PA
\ LPA occurring in the formulae φ
∗
1, . . . , φ
∗
k are
of the form cj,l for j < i, and the machine with the code e accepts sentences φ
∗
1, . . . , φ
∗
k
in less than N steps. By Theorem 9 (ACT) the theory ElDiag(M)∗ has a ∆k+1-full model
M′. This ends the proof of the claim * in PA.
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Now, we proceed to the proof of Lemma 64 which will end the proof of Theorem 63.
Proof. We work in PA. LetN be any∆2-model of B. By Lemma 65, there exists a∆3-full
recursively saturated modelM of B.
In our proof, we use a construction resembling the one given originally by Kripke in
[14]. As we have already noted in Subsection 3.3.2, a very similar argument appeared
before in [1] and [3]. By induction, we define a sequence of arithmetical formulae Γc, c ∈
M . That is, a sequence of elements Γc ∈M such thatM |= Γc ∈ Form
≤1
LPA
. Let Γ0(x) be a
definition of the atomic diagram ofM. More precisely, let
Γ0(x) := ∃s, t ∈ ClTermLPA x = (s = t) ∧ s
◦ = t◦.
Having defined the formula Γn, we set Γn+1(φ) (which we also denote by φ ∈ Γn+1) if
and only if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
•
∨
j≤n φ ∈ Γj .
• ∃t ∈ ClTermLB φ = T t ∧ t
◦ ∈ Γn.
• ∃t ∈ ClTermLB φ = ¬T t ∧ (¬t
◦) ∈ Γn.
• ∃ψ ∈ SentLT φ = (¬¬ψ) ∧ ψ ∈ Γn.
• ∃ψ, η ∈ SentLT φ = (ψ ∨ η) ∧ (ψ ∈ Γn ∨ η ∈ Γn).
• ∃ψ, η ∈ SentLT φ = ¬(ψ ∨ η) ∧ (¬ψ ∈ Γn ∧ ¬η ∈ Γn).
• ∃v ∈ Var ψ ∈ Form≤1LT φ = ∃vψ(v) ∧ ∃x ψ(x) ∈ Γn.
• ∃v ∈ Var ψ ∈ Form≤1LT φ = ¬∃vψ ∧ ∀x (¬φ(x)) ∈ Γn.
Now, let T be the subset of the domain of M defined as the sum
⋃
i∈N Γi(M). In other
words,
T (x) := ∃yM |= Γy(x).
Consider the expanded model (M, T ). Since the definition of (M, T ) is Σ1 in the com-
plexity ofM, the complexity of the resulting model is ∆4. We would like to ensure that
(M, T ) is a model KF−[B]. The model (M, T ) satisfies B, sinceM does, so it is enough to
check that (M, T ) satisfies truth-theoretic axioms KF1–KF10.
This is obvious for KF1,KF2. Let us check the claim for KF4. Suppose that (M, T ) |=
T (φ ∨ ψ). Since (M, T ) |= T (φ ∨ ψ), there exists i such that
M |= Γi(φ ∨ ψ).
Then by definition of Γi, eitherM |= φ ∈ Γi−1 (and, consequently, T (φ) holds) orM |=
ψ ∈ Γi−1 (and then T (ψ) holds). Conversely, if (M, T ) |= Tφ or (M, T ) |= Tψ, then
for some i, M |= φ ∈ Γi or M |= ψ ∈ Γi. But then φ ∨ ψ ∈ Γi+1 and, consequently,
(M, T ) |= T (φ∨ψ). This guarantees that (M, T ) |= KF4. The proofs for axioms KF3,KF5
are similar, as are the proofs for axioms KF9,KF10. Let us focus on axiom KF7.
Suppose that (M, T ) |= T¬∃v ψ. Then there exists i such thatM |= ¬∃v ψ ∈ Γi. This
implies that for all x, M |= ¬ψ(x) ∈ Γi−1. Therefore, for all x ∈ M , (M, T ) |= ¬ψ(x)
holds.
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Conversely, suppose that for all x ∈M , (M, T ) |= T¬ψ(x). In other words, for every
x ∈ M , there exists i such thatM |= ¬ψ(x) ∈ Γi. We claim that there exists k such that
for all x, M |= ¬ψ(x) ∈ Γk. Suppose otherwise. Then for every k, the following set of
arithmetical formulae is realised inM by some x:
¬ψ(x) /∈ Γ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬ψ(x) /∈ Γk.
Therefore, by recursive saturation, there exists an a ∈M ′ such that for every k,
¬ψ(a) /∈ Γk,
contrary to the assumption. This implies that there exists k ∈M such thatM |= ¬ψ(x) ∈
Γk for every x ∈ M
′, and thereforeM |= ¬∃xψ(x) ∈ Γk+1. We conclude that (M, T ) |=
KF7 holds. The case of axiom KF6 is straightforward.
In order to prove that KF8 holds, we check by induction on n (in PA) that this axiom
is satisfied by formulae in Γn. The conclusion follows immediately. This concludes the
proof of the lemma.
4.3 Feasible reduction of FS− to PA
In this section we strengthen the conservativity proof from Subsection 3.3.3 by establish-
ing the following result:
Theorem 66. FS− is feasibly reducible to PA.
The key step in our construction is to feasibly reduce the theory of ω-many truth pred-
icates, RT−<ω , defined in Subsection 3.3.3, to PA. This is achieved in the following lemma.
Lemma 67. RT−<ω is feasibly reducible to PA.
Proof. We shall prove that the assumptions of Corollary 34 hold for T = RT−<ω. Fix n and
an arbitrary finite fragment B of PA, w.l.o.g. B ⊇ IΣ1 and assume thatM |= B is a∆2-full
model. We shall build a ∆4-model of RT
−
<ω[B], which clearly suffices (note that now we
are talking about ω internally). The aim is to formalize in PA the conservativity proof
from Subsection 3.3.3. In order to do this we shall build a chain of uniformly definable
∆3-full models (Mn)n∈N such thatMLPA M0 and for each n
1. Mn is a full ∆3-model of RT
−
<n+1[B], and
2. Mk L<k+1 Mn for each k < n.
Clearly the limit model will be a model of RT−ω (even a full one—this follows by elemen-
tarity). To define the respective chain we shall implement the argument from Section 4.1:
the chain M0, . . . ,Mk will be described by a ∆2-theory Tk formulated in the language
LTk whose non-logical symbols are:
1. symbols of LB;
2. unary predicates: M0, . . . ,Mk;
3. unary predicates: T0, . . . , Tk.
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Similarly to the proof for CT−[B] in Subsection 4.1, the axioms of Tk can be divided into
three groups:
1. M0 is an elementary supmodel ofM. Formally this is expressed as an infinite set
of axioms:
{
φM0 | φ ∈ ElDiag(M)
}
.
2. (Mi)i≤k forms an elementary chain of submodels. More precisely: for each i,Mi
is an L<i+1 elementary submodel ofMi+1. Formally this is expressed analogously
to the condition (R2) from the proof for CT−.
3. For every i ≤ k,Mi is a model of RT
−
<i+1. This is expressed by formally relativizing
the axioms of RT−<i+1 toMi.
Now, by induction on nwe show that ∀nCon(Tn). We follow the lines of the sketch of
the conservativity proof given in Subsection 3.3.3. Forn = 0we simply use the proof from
Section 4.1 to build an elementary supmodel ofM satisfying CT−[B]. For the induction
step, note that, using the same reasoning as we did in Section 4.1 to verify Con(Tk+1),
it is enough to build a model for RT−<k+1 which would be a full model for L<k but will
possibly leave some sentenceswith Tk undefined. As in the conservativity proof forRT
−
<ω
we use the fact that RT−<k+1 is deductively equivalent to the theory IT below
17:
CT−[RT−<k] + ∀φ ∈ SentL<k−1
(
Tk−1(φ) ≡ T (φ)
)
. (IT )
From Con(Tk) we obtain a model K of RT
−
<k. We build an extension satisfying IT in ω
many steps via the union of chain argument. The following is the analogue of Lemma 58
in our situation:
Lemma 68 (Arithmetized Enayat–Visser construction+). The sentence expressing the follow-
ing implication is provable in PA for every l ∈ N:
If (M, S, P ) is a∆l-full model for L<k ∪ {S} ∪ {P} such that:
1. M |= IΣ1;
2. S is a P -restricted satisfaction class for L<k;
then there exists a∆l+1-full modelN and a∆l+1-set S
′ ⊆ N2 such that the following conditions
hold:
1. M N ;
2. S′ is anM -restricted satisfaction class for L<k (we add a predicate for the universe ofM to
the language);
3. S ⊆ S′;
4. for every φ ∈ Form<k−1(M), (N , S
′,M) |= Tk−1(φ)→ ∀αS
′ (φ, α).
17"I" abbreviates "Induction" as this theory is used in the induction step of our construction.
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Sketch of the proof. We indicate how to modify the proof Lemma 58. Firstly, we add the
following sentences to the definition of Enayat-Visser theory of (M, S, P ):
{∀α Uφ(α) | M |= Tk−1(φ)} . (∗)
Now we work with a finite fragment F of the Enayat and Visser theory. The next step
which requires a modification, is the definition of rankb for a coded set of sentences b.
According to the previous definition, formula φ was of rankb zero if and only if either
φ was atomic or some immediate subformula of φ was outside b. Now we will treat as
formulae of rankb zero all formulae from FormL<k−1(M) as well. For such formulae φ
we have an obvious candidate for the definition of θφ(x) (i.e. the formula defining the
extension for Uφ(x) inM). We define:
θφ(α) := Tk−1(φ[α]).
Note that Tk−1 satisfies generalized regularity, so it is sufficient to verify the truth of φ on
numerals naming values of α. The definition of rankb ≥ x is now as follows: there exists
a sequence y such that
1. len(y) = x+ 1 and (y)x = {φ}.
2. For all i < x+ 1 (y)i ⊆ b.
3. For all i < x for all θ, θ ∈ (y)i+1 iff θ ∈ FormL<k \ FormL<k−1 and for all ψ such that
M |= ψ ⊳ θ, ψ ∈ (y)i.
18
The definitions of rankb = x and b̂ (for an arbitrary b) are analogous to the ones from
the original lemma. The last step which requires a modification is the definition of the
formula ζ(x). Below, as in the proof for CT−, c is the set of formulae φ such thatUφ occurs
in F . We define ζ(x) to be the formula expressing:
"There exists the unique family of L<k ∪ {S}-formulae {θφ} rankĉ(φ)≤x indexed with
formulae of rankĉ ≤ x such that:
1. For every φ, if rankĉ(φ) = 0, then:
(a) ifM |= ∃t1, . . . , ta ∈ TermLBφ = R(t0, . . . , ta) for a relation symbol R ∈ LB,
then θφ(α) = R(t
α
0 , . . . , t
α
a ), and
(b) ifM |= ∃t ∈ TermLB(φ = Tk−1(t)), then θφ(α) = Tk−1(t
α), and
(c) if φ ∈ FormL<k−1(M), then θφ(x) := Tk−1(φ[x]), and
(d) if φ is from P , then θφ(x) = S(φ, x), and
(e) if for some ψ ∈ P , φ ≈M ψ, then Uφ is defined from Uψ using (Uφ̂ → Uφ) and
(Uφ → Uφ̂);
(f) otherwise θφ(x) = (x 6= x).
2. (M, S, P ) |= F ↾x [θφ/Uφ] rankĉ(φ)≤x."
Note that conditions (c) - (e) are the same as in the original definition. THe rest of the
proof is as previously.
18Note that if φ ∈ FormL<k−1 , this condition implies that y has length 1.
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Once we can prove ∀nCon(Tn), the construction of the chain (Mn)n∈ω and its sum is
precisely the same as in Section 4.1.
Now we want to finish the proof of Theorem 66. We have just shown that RT−<ω[PA]
satisfies the assumptions of Corollary 35 (with the "moreover" part). ByObservation 38, it
follows that RT−<ω[PA] is PA-provably feasibly strongly reflexive, i.e., there exists a P-time
computable function f such that for all n, k ∈ N, f(n, k) is a PA proof of the sentence
∀φ ∈ SentLPA
(
dp(φ) ≤ k ∧ Pr
RT
−
<ω↾n
(φ)→ Trk(φ)
)
. (REFn)
Note that there exists a P-time computable function g such that for any n, g(n) is a PA
proof of the sentence
∀φ ∈ SentLPA
(
dp(φ) ≤ n ∧ Pr
FS
−
n
(φ)→ Pr
RT
−
<2n+1
(φ)
)
. (HRn)
The above is in fact an easy consequence of the proof of Halbach’s reduction of FS− to
RT−<ω from Lemma 53.
Finally let us observe that the relation R(k, n,m) defined:
"k is a FS−n proof ofm"
is P-time, so, it is uniformly polynomially binumerable in I∆0 + Exp. This gives us a
function h such that for every proof π of a sentence φ, h(pπq, n) is a PA proof of Pr
FS
−
n
(φ).
Our desired reduction can now be defined as follows: given an FS− proof π of a sentence
φ compute n and k such that there are exactly n applications of NEC and CONEC in π
and φ is of depth k. Using h find the proof of Pr
FS
−
n
(φ). Compute g(n), i.e. the proof of
(HRn). Compute f(n, k), i.e. the proof of (REFn). Apply finitely many logical operations,
to conclude Trk(φ). Finally apply Theorem 25 to compute the proof of
Trk(φ) ≡ φ.
Concatenation of the above proofs yields a PA proof of φ.
4.4 Feasible interpretability of truth theories
In Section 2.5 we gave a terse proof of Theorem 32; that proof did not directly link the
notions of feasible reducibility with feasible interpretability, which is how we originally
conceived of—and arrived at—our main results. Since interpretations, especially of the
feasible variety, are of foundational and philosophical interest in connection with ax-
iomatic theories of truth, we now explain the interpretability-theoretic perspective of our
work by establishing the following result:
Theorem 69 (Feasible interpretability of truth theories). Let T be any of the truth theories
CT−[PA], KF−[PA], and FS−[PA]. Then there exists a uniformly polynomially correct family
{In}n∈N : T → PA
of interpretations (in the sense of Definition 40).
43
Note that, by Proposition 42, the existence of a uniformly polynomially correct fam-
ily of interpretations guarantees feasible reducibility. The proof of Theorem 69 can be
readily read-off the second proof of Theorem 32 which we give in this section. We shall
demonstrate that the assumptions of Theorem32 imply the existence of a uniformly poly-
nomially correct family of interpretations. This will make it clear that Theorem 69 holds
since we have already already verified in Subsections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 that the assump-
tions of Theorem 32 are met when T is any of the truth theories CT−[PA], KF−[PA], and
FS−[PA]. The second proof of Theorem 32 is based on a feasible version of the Arithme-
tized Completeness Theorem,which we now turn to. In Lemma 70 below an n-set should
be understood as a set that is definable by a formula of depth n ("definable" in the sense
of the feasible Satn predicates).
Lemma 70 (Feasible Arithmetized Completeness Theorem, FACT). There exists a polyno-
mial p(n) and a P-time computable function f such that for every n, f(n) is a PA proof of the
sentence expressing:
"If an n-theory T in a language L is consistent then it has a p(n)-model."
Moreover there exists a P-time computable function f such that for any l, k, f(l, k) is a PA proof
of the sentence expressing:
"IfM is an l-model of a k-theory T , then T is consistent."
Remark 71 (Uniformity of FACT). As a corollary to the proof of the above lemmawewill
obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 72. Suppose that φ(x, y¯) is an LPA-formula such that
PA ⊢ ”φ(x, y¯) defines a theory .”
(y¯ are the parameters). Then there exists a formula φ′(x, y¯) such that PA ⊢
"If φ is consistent, then φ′ defines a model for φ." (ACTφ)
Moreover, there exists a P-time computable function f , such that f(pφq) is a proof of ACTφ.
Proof of Lemma 70. See the Appendix.
Let us also mention that in addition to FACT we have also the Feasible Compactness
Theorem (the proof of which is rather obvious, as we deal here with consistency in the
syntactical sense)
Lemma 73 (ArithmetizedCompactness Theorem). There exists a P-time computable function
f such that for every n ∈ N, f(n) is a PA proof of the sentence
"An n-theory T is consistent if and only if each bounded fragment of T is consistent."
We are now ready to present the second proof of Theorem 32. We include the state-
ment here for the benefit of the reader.
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Theorem 74 (Theorem 32 redux). Let T be a theory extending PA with an NP-set of axioms.
If there is a polynomial p(n) such that for every n ∈ N,
PA ⊢p(n) ∀φ ∈ SentLPA
(
dp(φ) ≤ n ∧ PrT ↾n(φ)→ PrPA↾p(n)(φ)
)
. (∗)
Then PA polynomially simulates T . Moreover, if T admits a P-time computable set of axioms and
there exists a P-time computable function f such that for all n ∈ N, f(n) is a PA proof of
∀φ ∈ SentLPA
(
dp(φ) ≤ n ∧ PrT ↾n(φ)→ PrPA↾p(n)(φ)
)
,
then T is feasibly reducible to PA.
Second proof of Theorem 32, Sketch. Wewill construct a uniformlypolynomially correct fam-
ily of interpretations {In}n∈N : T → PA. Let us define the theory Φn:
x ∈ Φn := (Trn+1(x) ∨ x ∈ T ) ∧ ∃y
(
len(x) ≤ y ∧ Con
Trn+1
T↾y
)
, (3)
where ConTrnT↾y
says that there is no proof of contradiction using as axioms sentences in
T ↾y or true sentences of depth n (see Remark 20 for an explanation). Observe that the
length of (the formula defining) Φn is polynomial in n and its shape depends uniformly
on n. Then for every n, PA ⊢ ConΦn and the proof is uniform in n, so in fact there exists a
polynomial p1(n) such that for every n,
PA ⊢p1(n) ConΦn .
(for the precise argument see [9], Theorem 2.37). By FACT we know that there exists a
formulaMΦn and a polynomial p2(n) such that
PA + ConΦn ⊢
p2(n) MΦn is a full model for Φn. (∗∗)
Now In is defined as a relativization toMΦn i.e. a function defined on formulae of the
language of T which preserves boolean operations such that for every relational symbol
R and all terms s1, . . . , sn
(R(s1, . . . , sn))
In = pR(s1, . . . , sn)q ∈ MΦn
(recall that full models are coded as elementary diagrams) and for every existential for-
mula ∃xφ,
(∃xφ)In = ∃x ∈MΦn φ
In .
We check by contraposition that In is n-correct. Work in PA. Assume ¬φ, where φ is of
length at most n. We will derive φIn . Surely, ¬φ is of depth at most n + 1. Let q(n) be as
in Theorem 24. Then, by provable Tarski biconditionals, with a proof of length q(n) we
conclude
Trn+1(¬φ).
We show that this implies Φn(¬φ). By our main assumption (∗) and Lemma 33 we obtain
a polynomial p3(n) such that
PA ⊢O(p3(n,n)) Con
Trn+1
T↾n+1
,
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which directly implies that ¬φ belongs to Φn. Consequently
PA ⊢ MΦn |= ¬φ,
and the proof of it has length O(p1(n) + p2(n) + q(n) + p3(n, n)). Now using at most |φ|
many steps involving formulae of length polynomial in nwe obtain
¬(φ)Ik .
What is left to show is that for some polynomial p(n, k) and each k ∈ N,
PA ⊢p(n,k) ψIk ,
for every sentence ψ in T ↾n. We use polynomial binumerability of T ↾n to guarantee
that there is a polynomial p4 such that for all n and ψ ∈ T ↾n,
PA ⊢p4(n) ψ ∈ T ↾n .
Now, as previously, we have
PA ⊢O(p3(n,k)) ConTrkT ↾n .
Hence, adding a few more steps, we also have
PA ⊢O(p4(n)) ψ ∈ Φk.
Then, as previously we check that ψIk is satisfied.
The "moreover" part holds, since if T is P-time computable, then we can feasibly find
a PA proof witnessing that
PA ⊢ φ ∈ T ↾n .
The rest of steps are fully analogous.
5 Open Questions
The proofs of our main results in Section 4 suggest that the answers to the following
questions are both in the positive; we pose themhere as questions since definitive positive
answers to them requires a number of technical verifications that are yet to be carried out.
Question A. Is the conservativity of CT−[PA], KF−[PA], and FS−[PA] over PA provable in
Buss’s system S12?
Question B. Suppose B is a sequential theory that is inductive; i.e., the scheme of induc-
tion over the natural numbers of B is provable in B. Are CT−[B], KF−[B], and FS−[B]
feasibly reducible to B?
6 Appendix
The bulk of thework in the following paper is inherently technical, especially sincewe are
dealing with nuanced arithmetizations and sizes of proofs, and therefore the arguments
need to be checked in a very careful manner. In order to minimally distract the reader
from the main flow of the argument, we decided to relegate some of the checking to this
Appendix.
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6.1 Feasible reflexivity
In Section 2.5, we proved Theorem 32 which is the technical core of our paper and which
provides us with a uniformway of obtaining polynomial simulations and feasible reduc-
tions. We presented two proofs of that theorem. The first of them used the following
Lemma (originally Lemma 33):
Lemma 75. There exists a P-time computable function f such that for all n, k ∈ N f(n, k) is a
PA proof of the:
∀φ
(
dp(φ) ≤ k ∧ PrPA↾n(φ)→ Trk(φ)
)
.
It states that we can uniformly find PA proofs of the uniform reflection for bounded
fragments of PA. In the proof, we assumed that the statement holds for the axioms in
these fragments, and that arithmetical satisfaction predicates enjoy certain regularity
properties. Below, we formulate these results in a precise manner and prove them.
Definition 76. 1. If α is a valuation and v is in the domain of α, then by α[v 7→ x] we
mean a valuation α′ which is the same as α except for the variable v whose value is
x.
2. If y is a formula, then Ind(y, v) denotes the instantiation of the induction scheme
(with parameters) with formula y w.r.t. v, i.e. the following formula
(y[0/v] ∧ ∀v (y → y[S(v)/v]) → ∀vy) .
For the sake of simplicity we assume that PA is axiomatized by induction schemewith
free variables treated as parameters. This is in order to avoid taking universal closures of
axioms. Let us observe that, living inside PA, we know that every object can be named
by a closed term. The Proposition below says that for every formula φ being satisfied by
a sequence y is equivalent to the truth of the sentence φ[y].19
Convention 77. For the sake of simplicity let us agree that saying that for every n the fam-
ily {φn}n∈N is uniformly feasible in nmeans that there exists a P-time computable function
f such that for each n, f(n) is PA proof of φn.
Proposition 78. The following regularity properties for Satn predicates are uniformly feasible in
n:
1. [(dp(y) = n ∧ α′ = α[v 7→ S(α(v))]) → Satn(y, α
′) ≡ Satn(y[S(v)/v], α)].
2. [(dp(y) = n ∧ α′ = α[v 7→ z])→ Satn(y, α
′) ≡ Satn(y[z/v], α)].
Proposition 79 (Essentially Pudlák, [17]). The following formulae are uniformly feasible in n:
1. dp(x) = n ∧ ”x is a logical axiom ” ∧ α ∈ Asn(x)→ Satn(x, α)
2. dp(y) = n ∧ ”y is of the form x → z” ∧ α ∈ Asn(y) ∧ Satn(y, α) ∧ Satn(x, α) →
Satn(z, α)
Now we prove that for every n the truth of all PA axioms of induction of depth n can
be feasibly established in PA.
19For the notation φ[y], recall Definition 3.
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Proposition 80. The following sentences are uniformly feasible in n:
∀y ∈ Form1LPA∀v ∈ Var (v ∈ FV(y) ∧ dp(Ind(y, v)) = n ∧ α ∈ Asn(y)→ Satn(Ind(y), α)) .
Proof of Proposition 80. For the purposesof this proof, we say that y is small if dp(Ind(y, v)) ≤
n. Let φ1(y, v, α) abbreviate the following formula:
"y is a small formula such that v is a free variable of y and α is an assignment for y"
Moreover let φ2(y, v, α, x) abbreviate
∃α′ (α′ = α[v 7→ x] ∧ Satn(y, α
′)),
Let φ(x, v, y, α) = φ1(y, v, α) ∧ φ2(y, v, α, x). The idea is that α encodes a sequence of
parameters used in the induction and x is the varying value assigned to the variable v
while proving ∀vy via induction. We work in PA. We start with Ind(φ(x, v, y, α), x)which
is an axiom of length polynomial in n (since φ(x, v, y, α) is). Using a few transformations
(their number is independent of n) we obtain
∀x, v, y, α (φ1(y, v, α)→ Ind(φ2(y, v, α, x), x))
Let us look at Ind(φ2(y, v, α, x), x). Observe that by Proposition 78
1. φ2(y, v, α, 0) is equivalent to Satn(y[0/v], α) and
2. φ2(y, v, α, S(x)) is equivalent to Satn(y[S(v)/v], α).
Hence Ind(φ2(y, v, α, x), x) implies
Satn(y[0/v], α) ∧ ∀x (Satn(y, α[v 7→ x])→ Satn(y[S(v)/v], α[v 7→ x])) −→
−→ ∀x Satn(y, α[v 7→ x]).
Now by compositional axioms for Satn the above is equivalent to
Satn(Ind(y, v)).
6.2 Congruence lemma
We sketch the proof of the following lemma from Section 4.1.
Lemma 81 (Congruence lemma). For all φ, φ′, ψ′ it holds that(
φ ⊳ φ′ ∧ φ′ ≈M ψ′
)
⇒ ∃ψ
(
ψ ⊳ ψ′ ∧ ψ ≈M φ
)
. (C)
Sketch of the proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the complexity of φ (carried out
inMwhichwe assumed to satisfy IΣ1). The only non-trivial step is the one for ∃. Assume
φ′ = ∃vφ. Then ψ′ = ∃vψ. Take φ̂′(= ψ̂′), which, by definition, is of the form ∃vη. In η
replace all the occurrences of maximal terms in η (i.e. the ones which do not occur within
a term) which contain only free variables (in η) with fresh variables, without using the
same variable twice. Then rename the free variables of the resulting formula according
to the procedure adopted in condition 4. of the definition of the term trivialization. In
this way we obtain the term trivialization of both ψ and φ.
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6.3 FACT
In Subsection 4.4, an alternative proof has been provided of Theorem 32 which says that
if PA proves reflection over fragments of another theory T , then T is feasibly reducible
to PA. The second proof of that theorem used the fact that arithmetized completeness
theorem can proved with a proof of size polynomial in the size of the formula defining
T . This was stated as Lemma 70. In this subsection, we prove this result.
Lemma 82 (Feasible Arithmetized Completeness Theorem, FACT). There exists a polyno-
mial p(n) and a P-time computable function f such that for every n, f(n) is a PA proof of the
sentence
"If an n-theory T in a language L is consistent then it has a p(n) full model"
Moreover, there exists a P-time computable function f such that for any l, k, f(l, k) is a PA proof
of the sentence
"IfM is a l-full model of a k-theory T , then T is consistent."
Proof. To prove the second part we show by induction on the lengths of proofs that any
l-full model (which, recall, is the same as a complete consistent Henkinized theory) is
closed under reasoning in first order logic. This argument is carried out uniformly with
the only difference that we use different feasible satisfaction predicates depending on the
complexity of the model.
To prove the first part we follow the "leftmost branch" strategy. The proof is routine
but we present it to be on the safe side. Assume that an L-theory θ(x) of depth n is
consistent. (Note that θ(x) and Lmight contain arbitrary parameters.) Note that we need
not care about the rise in Σk-complexity of the formula defining a model for θ(x) as long
as the construction of the relevant formula is uniformly feasible in n. Let FormHL be the
set of formulae of L enriched with Henkin constants (we denote the Henkin constant for
the formula φ with cφ and assume that the function φ 7→ cφ is ∆1).
Step 1.: finding a complete, consistent Henkin extension Let θ′(x) be defined as
θ(x) ∨ ∃φ, v
(
v ∈ Var ∧ φ ∈ FormHL ∧ x = (∃vφ→ φ[cφ/v])
)
.
Here θ′(x) is of depth polynomial in n (we may assume that the length, hence also the
depth, of the formula defining L is polynomial in n) and of length polynomial in the
length of θ. We check that Conθ′(x) holds: each proof of ∃x(x 6= x) from the axioms of
θ′(x) can be transformed into θ(x) proof of
¬
∧
j≤a
(∃vijφj → φj [cφ/vij ]).
Then we check that the above is equivalent to
¬
∧
j≤a
(∃vijφj ∧ ∀vij¬φij ).
which contradicts the consistency of θ. Note that the above argument is uniform in θ.
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Let σ(x) = y be any enumeration of FormHL . For any binary sequence τ of length y let
enum(σ, τ, y) be the theory:
x ∈ enum(σ, τ, y) := ∃i < y ((τ(i) = 0 ∧ x = σ(i)) ∨ (τ(i) = 1 ∧ x = ¬σ(i))) .
enum(σ, τ, y) enumerates first y elements of σ, adding negation at the front of the i-th
element if τ(i) = 1. Let θH(x) be the sentence saying:
"There exist the unique y, τ such that
1. τ is a binary sequence of length y and
2. ∀i < y
(
τ(i) = 0 ⇐⇒ Conθ′+enum(σ,τ,i)+σ(i)
)
and
3.
(
Conθ′+enum(σ,τ,y)+σ(y) ∧ x = σ(y)
)
∨
(
¬Conθ′+enum(σ,τ,y)+σ(y) ∧ x = ¬σ(y)
)
."
Once again θH(x) is of length polynomial in the length of θ and this polynomial does not
depend on the initial choice of θ. We show that θH is a complete and consistent theory
with Henkin sentences (which, according to our definitions is the same as a full model).
The whole argument was carried out uniformly in θ and can be produced by a P-time
function f .
6.4 A glossary of technical notions
This paper contains a fairly large number of technical definitions; here we enclose a glos-
sary of such terms in order to assist the reader.
• x ∈ Asn(y) means that x is an assignment for a formula or a term y (or for a set of
terms or formulae y), i.e. x is a function whose domain includes the free variables
of y (or whose domain includes free variables of all elements of y). See Definition 1
and Convention 4.
• x ∈ ClTermL means that x is a closed term of a language L, see Definition 1 and
Convention 4.
• x ∈ ClTermSeqL means that x is a sequence of closed terms of a language L, see
Definition 1 and Convention 4.
• ConT is an arithmetized consistency statement for T . See Corollary 19.
• CT− is the compositional theory of truth over PA, see Definition 44.
• CT−[B] is the compositional theory of truth over a theory B extending I∆0 + Exp,
see Definition 44.
• dp(φ) is the syntactic depth of a formula φ, see Definition 22.
• ElDiag(M) (elementary diagram ofM) is the same as a full modelM, this notation
is usedwhenM is viewed as a completeHenkinized theory, rather than a structure.
• x ∈ FormL means that x is a formula of the language L, see Definition 1 and Con-
vention 4.
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• x ∈ Form≤1L means that x is a formula of the language L with at most one free
variable, see Definition 1 and Convention 4.
• x ∈ Form1L(x) means that x is a formula of the language L with exactly one free
variable, see Definition 1 and Convention 4.
• FS− is the Friedman–Sheard self-referential theory of truth over PA without induc-
tion, see Definition 46.
• FS−[B] is the Friedman–Sheard self-referential theory of truth over a theory B ex-
tending I∆0 + Exp without induction, see Definition 46.
• x ∈ FV(y)means that x is a free variable of y, see Definition 1 and Convention 4.
• x ∈ FVSeq(y) means that y is a coded sequence whose elements are (some) free
variables of x, see Definition 1 and Convention 4.
• KF− is the Kripke–Feferman self-referential theory of truth over PA without induc-
tion, see Definition 45.
• KF−[B] is the Kripke–Feferman self-referential theory of truth over a theory B ex-
tending I∆0 + Exp without induction, see Definition 45.
• len(s) is the length of a sequence s, see Definition 1 and Convention 4.
• n-model (full model) is a (full) model defined with a formula of depth n.
• PrT (y)means that there exists a proof of y in the theory T . See Corollary 19.
• ProofT (m,n)means thatm is a proof of n from the theory T . See Corollary 19.
• x ∈ SentL means that x is a sentence of the language L, see Definition 1 and Con-
vention 4.
• x ∈ TermLmeans that x is a termof the languageL, seeDefinition 1 andConvention
4.
• x ∈ TermSeqL means that x is a sequence of terms of the language L, see Definition
1 and Convention 4.
• n-theory is a theory defined with a formula of depth n.
• Var(x)means that x is (an arithmetized) variable, see 1.
• β ∼v αmeansα and β are functions, v is a variable andα(w) = β(w) for all variables
w, possibly except for v which also possibly belongs only to the domain of β, see
Definition 1.
• φ[α] is a formula φwith the numeral α(v) substitued for every every occurrence of
v for every free variable v of φ, see Definition 3.
• φ[s/v] denotes the formula φwith the term s substituted for the variable v, see Def-
inition 3.
• ‖ φ ‖T is the length of the shortest proof of φ in T , see Definition 11.
• φ ⊳ ψ means that φ is an immediate subformula of ψ, see the proof of Lemma 58.
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• φ̂ is the term trivialization of φ, see remarks preceding Lemma 61.
• M L N means thatM
′  N ′, whereM′,N ′ are reducts ofM,N to the language
L, see Definition 30 or 7 and the subsequent remarks.
• tα is the value of term t in which every free variable v has been evaluated to α(v),
see Definition 3.
• T ⊢n φ means that the length of the shortest proof of φ in T is not greater than n,
see Definition 11.
• T ↾n for a theory T means the set of axioms of T of length at most n, see Definition
31.
• x is a numeral denoting x, see Definition 2 and Convention 4.
• x◦ = y means that y is the value of the term x, see Definition 1 and Convention 4.
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